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Abstract 
 
During the summer of 1842, Emir Nasrullah of Bukhara, in what is now 
Uzbekistan, beheaded Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Stoddart and Captain Arthur Conolly, 
two British officers sent to his kingdom on a diplomatic mission. Reports of the officers’ 
deaths caused an uproar across Britain, and raised questions about the extent to which 
Britons abroad were entitled to government protection. Historians have generally 
examined the officers’ deaths exclusively in the context of the Great Game (the 
nineteenth century Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central Asia) without addressing the furor 
the crisis caused in England. By focusing too narrowly on the relevance of this crisis to 
the Anglo-Russian relations, scholars have overlooked the way Britons of the 1840s 
interpreted the crisis. This thesis argues that in order to understand the Stoddart and 
Conolly crisis fully, historians must also consider the British response to it, both in the 
press and in the form of a popular campaign. Seen in this light, the Stoddart and Conolly 
crisis is significant not merely as an event in the history of the Great Game, but also as an 
incident which raised lasting questions about the extent of the government’s 
responsibility to and for its agents. 
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A Note on Transliterations and Titles 
 
The primary sources consulted for this project transliterate key place names, 
ethnic identifiers, and titles in a number of ways, and their preferred transliterations are 
rarely those accepted by convention today. Because the differences are uniformly minor, 
I have chosen to adopt modern spellings of towns and terms for ethnicities for my own 
text, though I have not altered the spellings when I quote from primary sources. For most 
names and titles, because they are largely unfamiliar to the twenty-first century reader, I 
have adopted the most common spelling in the primary sources, again maintaining 
original spellings in direct quotations from those sources. I have made an exception to 
this rule with the title “emir,” however, because a familiar modern spelling exists. Below 
is a list of key locations, terms for ethnicities, and titles, as I have chosen to spell them, 
along with their more common manifestations in primary source material and, where 
appropriate, a definition. 
The meanings of terms such as “Central Asia” and “Turkestan” vary by author, 
and are not always clearly defined. For the purposes of this project, I have defined 
Central Asia as including the khanates of Kokand and Khiva and the emirate of Bukhara, 
but not Afghanistan. Some scholars do treat Afghanistan as part of Central Asia. 
However, for the period with which I am concerned, it was subject to different British 
policies than the Uzbek khanates and Bukhara. Therefore, for the sake of precision, I 
have chosen not to include it in my definition of Central Asia. The modern countries of 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, and the Chinese province of Xinjiang, are also 
frequently incorporated into definitions of Central Asia. I have excluded them here, not 
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because I believe they ought to be categorized differently, but simply because they did 
not enter significantly into early Victorian British foreign policy. In the newspapers of the 
day, the terrain between Orenburg and Khiva was treated as a wasteland; it is 
unfortunately far beyond the scope of this project to question that understanding. 
 
 
Bukhara Bokhara. Located in modern south-central Uzbekistan, both the name of 
an emirate and the name of that emirate’s capital city. 
Emir Ameer, Amir. The Emir of Bokhara is sometimes referred to as its king 
in British sources. He is also sometimes called a khan, though this term 
more accurately applies to the rulers of Kokand and Khiva. 
Nayeb Wolff translates this term as “lieutenant.” The nayeb Abdul Samut Khan 
was most important official of the emir’s court in the experiences of 
Stoddart, Conolly, and Wolff. His primary role seems to have been that 
of military advisor to the emir, and it is a role he seems to have acquired 
on the basis of knowledge and experience rather than other factors. See 
Joseph Wolff, Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara in the Years 1843-
1845, to Ascertain the Fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1845), 200  
Topchi bashi The Bokharan chief of artillery, who takes over some of the 
responsibilities of the Qush-begi when necessary. See Nikolai Khanikoff, 
Bokhara: Its Amir and Its People (trans. Baron Clement A. de Bode, 
 v 
London: James Madden, 1845), 245. 
Qush-begi 
(Kush-beghi) 
Goosh-Bekee. The vizier, the administrative head of the region 
immediately surrounding the city of Bokhara. See Nikolai Khanikoff, 
Bokhara: Its Amir and Its People (trans. Baron Clement A. de Bode, 
London: James Madden, 1845), 242f. 
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Introduction 
 
Imprisoned and forbidden to write, Captain Arthur Conolly, of the British East 
India Company, used the margins and blank pages of a Christian prayer book to 
surreptitiously record his experience as a prisoner of the emir of Bukhara. His situation 
was dire; he and fellow prisoner Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stoddart, of the British 
Army, had been prisoners of the emir of Bukhara since December of 1841. Both men 
were in poor health, and Conolly describes Stoddart as “half naked and much lacerated.”1 
On 11 March 1842, he wrote that he and Stoddart 
prayed together, and then said…let him [the emir of Bokhara] do as he 
likes. He is a demon, but God is stronger than the devil himself, and can 
certainly release us from the hands of this fiend whose heart he has 
perhaps hardened to work out great ends by it. And we have risen again 
from our knees with hearts comforted as if an angel had spoken to them, 
resolved, please God, to wear our English honesty and dignity to the last 
within all the misery and filth that this monster may try to degrade us 
with.2 
 
Conolly had arrived in Bukhara in December of 1841, having departed for Central 
Asia from Afghanistan in the fall of 1840. Commissioned with the unenviable task of 
encouraging friendly relations among the rival Uzbek khanates of Khoqand and Khiva, 
Conolly travelled to Bukhara on Stoddart’s invitation. Stoddart had been imprisoned and 
released several times since his arrival in Bukhara in 1838. However, he was enjoying a 
position of favor in the Bukharan emir’s court during the summer of 1841, and promised 
Conolly that the emir would treat him with similar distinction. Within days of Conolly’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Arthur Conolly, “Diary (1840-1842), and Extracts of the Last Letters, of Captain Arthur 
Conolly,” British Library Add MS 38725, London. 
2 Ibid. 
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arrival in Bukhara, however, Stoddart had been arrested once again, and this time 
Conolly was arrested alongside him. The following summer, both were beheaded at the 
emir’s order when it was discovered that they had attempted to communicate with the 
outside world without the emir’s permission.3  
When Stoddart and Conolly arrived in Bukhara, the emirate was controlled by the 
Mangit dynasty, the first non-Chinggisid dynasty to rule in Bukhara since Chinggis 
Khan’s Mongol armies conquered it in the thirteenth century.4 The emir was Nasrullah 
Khan, a younger son of the previous emir who had gained the throne by conspiring 
against his elder brother and murdering him, along with four other brothers,5 on the basis 
of which his subjects called him “Amir the Butcher.6 Under Nasrullah, Bukhara became 
significantly more autocratic than the neighboring khanates of Khiva and Khoqand. 
Nasrullah established a standing military, including the artillery for which he later 
compelled Stoddart to recruit soldiers, which he used both to consolidate his own power 
within Bukhara and to menace neighboring states. Bukhara competed with Khoqand for 
supremacy in Central Asia throughout the first half of the nineteenth century; under 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For this version of Stoddart and Conolly’s imprisonment and death, see Fitzroy 
MacLean, A Person From England: And Other Travelers (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1958), 80-82; Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia 
(New York: Kondansha USA, 1994), 230-236, 278f. 
4 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
 180. 
5 Joseph Wolff, Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara in the Years 1843-1845, to Ascertain 
the Fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1845), 
190. See also Nikolai Khanikoff, Bokhara: Its Amir and its People (London: James 
Madden, 1845), 295-302. 
6 Yuri Bregel, “The New Uzbek States: Bukhara, Khiva, and Khoqand: c. 1750-1886,” in 
The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age, eds. Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen 
J. Frank, and Peter B. Golden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 397. 
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Nasrullah in 1842, its armies succeeded in capturing the capital of Khoqand.7 Though the 
success proved short-lived, Bukhara remained Central Asia’s most significant trading 
center in the first half of the nineteenth century.8 
Bukhara existed at the outer reaches of British imperial influence at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, but Stoddart and Conolly were far from the first British visitors 
to it. A century before Stoddart and Conolly’s imprisonment, a merchant known as 
George Thompson visited Bukhara, hoping to establish a trade relationship between it 
and Britain. Thompson’s venture failed, but an account of it was published in a 
monograph about British trade in Persia and around the Caspian Sea.9 Ninety years later, 
another Briton, Alexander Burnes, visited Bukhara while working for the East India 
Company. In the intervening years, Bukhara had received other European guests, 
including another British traveller: the East India company veterinarian William 
Moorcroft, who arrived in Bukhara hoping to purchase some of the region’s famous 
horses.10 Although Moorcroft’s stay in Bukhara was omitted from his posthumously 
published travel diary, Burnes authored a lengthy account of his stay in the city, which 
sold some nine hundred copies on its first day in print.11 On his return to Britain after his 
journey’s conclusion, he was lauded in the academic societies of the day and welcomed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Yuri Bregel, “The New Uzbek States: Bukhara, Khiva, and Khoqand: c. 1750-1886,” in 
The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age, eds. Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen 
J. Frank, and Peter B. Golden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 397. 
8 Ibid., 404. 
9 Jonas Hanway, An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea: With a 
Journal of Travels from London through Russia into Persia; and Back Again through 
Russia, Germany, and Holland (London: 1753), 345-357. 
10 Hopkirk, The Great Game, 90f. 
11 James Lunt, Bokhara Burnes (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 168. 
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into the most elite social circles both in Britain and in France.12 Though several Britons 
visited Bukhara before him, then, Burnes seems to have played a more significant role 
than they in familiarizing the British public with Bukhara’s history and culture. 
The point of departure for this thesis has been the handful of histories that discuss 
the deaths of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly in detail. All of these works place 
Stoddart and Conolly in the context of British policy in Central Asia, and of the political 
agents, such as Burnes, who advanced it. For some historians, Stoddart and Conolly 
comprised a noteworthy chapter in this narrative; indeed, Fitzroy Maclean, who 
published A Person from England: And Other Travelers in 1958, devoted an entire 
ninety-three page chapter to the episode.13 M.E. Yapp discussed Stoddart and Conolly at 
some length in a chapter of Strategies of British India, in which he combined analysis of 
the Anglo-Russian rivalry with scrutiny of Stoddart and Conolly’s characters and 
temperaments.14 Peter Hopkirk, though he chose not to dedicate an entire chapter of The 
Great Game to the story, did report the events in considerable detail in the context of 
more general British ambitions in Central Asia and Afghanistan.15 For Karl E. Meyer and 
Shareen Blair Brysac, authors of Tournament of Shadows, however, Stoddart and Conolly 
merit only much briefer discussion—a few pages here and there, when most relevant to 
British fortunes elsewhere in Asia.16  
As their similar contextualizations of Stoddart and Conolly would suggest, these 
works rely largely on the same body of sources relating to the officers and their fate. One !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 James Lunt, Bokhara Burnes (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 166-171. 
13 Maclean, A Person From England, 17-110. 
14 M.E. Yapp, Strategies of British India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 381-418. 
15 Hopkirk, The Great Game. 
16 Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game 
and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
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of the most important published sources for these accounts was the Narrative of a 
Mission to Bokhara, published in 1845 by the Reverend Dr. Joseph Wolff. Wolff knew 
Conolly before the latter joined Stoddart in Bukhara, and responded to Grover’s public 
plea for someone to travel to Bukhara to determine the truth of rumors about the officers’ 
execution. His Narrative of a Mission recounted his journey to and from the emir’s court 
between late 1843 and early 1845, and is generally used to as the source of details 
regarding Stoddart and Conolly’s final months in Bukhara, the facts of which remained 
uncertain in Britain until Wolff’s return.17 Maclean, Yapp, and other authors who have 
recently written about Stoddart and Conolly also rely heavily on official government 
documents on the case, most of which are now held by the British Library and the 
National Archives in London. These include the letters of Colonel Sheil, the British 
ambassador to Tehran and London’s primary source of official information on the case, 
as well as letters to and from the Foreign Office in London and a collection of 
confidential papers (consisting mostly of correspondence) produced by the East India 
Company.18  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Wolff, Narrative of a Mission. 
18 Foreign Office Series 60, The National Archives, Kew, England, contains all official 
Foreign Office correspondence relating to Persia for the period in question. 
Communication between Bukhara and India was minimal due to the ongoing conflict in 
Afghanistan; as a result, most of the government’s information on Bukhara and the 
Uzbek khanates came through Persia. The British Library’s holdings on Bukhara are 
more disparate, but include the volume of confidential papers mentioned here, some of 
which are transcriptions of Foreign Office letters; see “Further Papers Respecting the 
Detention of Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly at Bukhara,” British 
Library, India Office Records L/PS/20/A7/2, London. The most important non-official 
document is Conolly’s prison journal, which is also held by the British Library; see 
Arthur Conolly, “Diary (1840-1842), and Extracts of the Last Letters, of Captain Arthur 
Conolly,” British Library Add MS 38725, London. 
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Therefore, when scholars from the second half of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first have written about Stoddart and Conolly in Bukhara, they 
have produced narratives of limited scope, focusing only on the events in Bukhara as 
understood by the British government in London. Though significant, this account of 
Stoddart and Conolly’s fate in Bukhara represents only a portion of the story’s 
significance, and neglects a large body of primary sources relating to the response to the 
officers’ deaths in Britain.  
Among the sources that are underutilized in this narrative are the two publications 
by Captain John Grover, a British army officer who knew Stoddart personally and 
launched a public campaign to discover the truth of his and Conolly’s fate in Bukhara. In 
1843, Grover published a pamphlet entitled An Appeal to the British Nation. He argued 
that, contrary to the official version of the crisis, which had been confirmed in Parliament 
by Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, the emir of Bukhara had not killed the British officers, 
both of whom remained at Bukhara awaiting release.19 He presented the same argument 
in his book The Bokhara Victims, published in the spring of 1845, which also included a 
lengthy account of his efforts to persuade the British Foreign Office of the importance of 
his cause, his many communications with the press on the matter, and the leading role he 
took in facilitating Dr. Wolff’s journey to Bukhara on Stoddart and Conolly’s behalf.20 
Also absent from recent scholars’ work are the multitude of newspaper and periodical 
articles which appeared in papers across Britain, repeating the latest reports from Tehran, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 John Grover, An Appeal to the British Nation in Behalf of Colonel Stoddart and 
Captain Conolly, Now in Captivity in Bokhara (London: Hatchard and Sons, 1843). For 
Peel’s confirmation of Stoddart and Conolly’s death, see Hansard’s Parliamentary 
Debates, 3rd ser. vol. 66, col 635 (15 February 1843). 
20 John Grover, The Bokhara Victims (London: Chapman and Hall, 1845). 
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Lahore, Bombay, or Constantinople about the officers’ fate. Many of these articles reflect 
either implicitly or explicitly on the appropriate response of the British government to 
this crisis. Both Grover’s writings and these newspaper articles were frequently critical of 
the government’s lack of action in the Stoddart and Conolly crisis.  
There is, in fact, another face to the history of Stoddart and Conolly that is almost 
entirely absent from the sequence of events that Maclean, Hopkirk, Meyer, and Brysac 
present: the response the crisis occasioned in Britain. Stoddart’s imprisonment initially 
produced relatively little concern in Britain outside his own family; in fact, it was not 
until rumors that both men were dead began to circulate that public outcry began in 
earnest. When contradictory reports began to circulate in the weeks and months after the 
government originally confirmed the officers’ execution, what had begun as a tragedy 
quickly developed into a controversy. Captain John Grover, a friend of Colonel Stoddart, 
offered to travel to Bukhara himself to determine the true fate of the officers.21 When the 
Foreign Office, under Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, refused to sanction his 
proposal, Grover despaired of being able to help his friend. However, the Reverend Dr. 
Joseph Wolff, a missionary who had travelled to Bukhara previously, offered to travel to 
Bukhara without official status from the Foreign Office, and Grover agreed to help him 
raise funds for the journey.22 Grover therefore formed a committee, which held public 
meetings in high-profile lecture and concert halls in London to raise awareness for the 
officers’ fate, and to solicit contributions to fund Wolff’s expedition. Throughout the 
doctor’s journey, Grover was his primary correspondent, and regularly forwarded 
summaries, extracts, or copies of his letters both to the Foreign Office and to the major !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Grover, The Bokhara Victims, 48f. 
22 Ibid., 65-69. 
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London newspapers for publication. Largely due to his persistence, the fate of Colonel 
Stoddart and Captain Conolly were kept more or less consistently before both the Foreign 
Office and the newspaper-reading public throughout the lengthy crisis.  
It is this second aspect to the tragedy of Stoddart and Conolly that this thesis 
examines. I argue that to view the Stoddart and Conolly crisis only as an incident in the 
Great Game—the Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central Asia—is to overlook completely its 
impact in Britain. The crisis was widely covered in the press, and Grover and Wolff 
obtained further publicity for it through their campaign. Despite considerable diversity in 
the press’ views of the appropriate government response to the crisis, Grover, Wolff, and 
commentators in the press were united by a common desire to determine the extent to 
which the British government bore responsibility for the well-being of its agents abroad. 
By examining the Stoddart and Conolly affair in this British context, we gain insight into 
the nature of the early Victorian press and the role of evangelicalism and the missionary 
in Victorian society. The British aspect of the Stoddart and Conolly affair also raises the 
question of the government’s responsibility for its citizens abroad, which continued to 
trouble Victorian Britain long after this crisis had ended.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I have divided the Stoddart and Conolly affair into 
two phases. The first began when the initial reports of Stoddart’s imprisonment in 
Bukhara reached the British press in late 1839 and concluded in mid-1843. This phase 
largely lacked leadership, although several members of the House of Commons 
occasionally inquired into the government’s efforts to secure Stoddart and Conolly’s 
release. In general, however, calls for government intervention in the officers’ fate and 
inquiry into the extent of government responsibility for it came from the press in the form 
! 14 
of anonymously authored news articles. The first and second chapters of this thesis are 
concerned with this first phase of the crisis. 
The first chapter addresses the role that Stoddart and Conolly’s Christian faith and 
moral character played in establishing the government’s responsibility toward them: as 
loyal officers and men of exemplary character, they were deemed a source of national 
pride, and it was therefore a national obligation either to secure their release or to seek 
restitution for their deaths. Although not all articles that describe the officers’ character or 
faith explicitly use these factors to call for government action on their behalf, the 
connection is often made very clear.  
The second chapter examines the political context of Stoddart and Conolly’s 
imprisonment and execution. A significant subset of the press coverage during the first 
phase of the crisis associated the officers’ fate with British policy in Afghanistan. Most of 
these sources concur that the First Anglo-Afghan War impacted the emir’s treatment of 
the officers, even indirectly causing their deaths, but in general only those that supported 
the invasion of Afghanistan advocated military intervention on Stoddart and Conolly’s 
behalf.  
The second phase of the crisis, which I address in my third and fourth chapters, 
overlapped slightly with the first, beginning in July of 1843, when Captain John Grover 
began advocating for Stoddart and Conolly, and ending in mid-1845, when Dr. Joseph 
Wolff returned from his journey to Bukhara. Grover’s leadership, the subject of the third 
chapter of this thesis, dramatically altered the primary focus of the debate surrounding 
Stoddart and Conolly. In the early years of the crisis, commentators focused primarily on 
evaluating the government’s responsibility to and for its agents. Grover, by contrast, 
! 15 
began by questioning the reports that Stoddart and Conolly had been executed, and 
therefore directed his attention primarily to discovering the truth about their fate. He 
publicized his campaign through the formation of a committee that held public meetings, 
the publication of a pamphlet and a book, and communication with the press and Foreign 
Office. Due to his influence and persistence, the Stoddart and Conolly affair generated 
much more, and much more consistent, public attention than it had prior to his 
involvement.  
The fourth chapter examines Joseph Wolff’s role in the transformation of the 
public discourse on the Stoddart and Conolly affair. Wolff played a significant role in 
shaping the conversation. His dramatic stories and sensational descriptions lent a drama 
to Grover’s campaign that Grover’s own activities, limited primarily to letter writing, 
could not rival. As a traveller to Bukhara, Wolff also contributed to preexisting orientalist 
literature on Central Asia, in that he wrote about the characters and cultures of the 
populations he met as he travelled, reinforcing stereotypes of “Eastern” despotism and 
cruelty and contributing to the burgeoning field of ethnology. Perhaps most importantly, 
as a well-known Christian missionary, Wolff brought to Grover’s cause an audience 
Grover likely could not have attracted on his own. 
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Chapter One:  
Christianity and Character: Stoddart and Conolly as British Heroes 
 
Shortly after the first reports of Stoddart and Conolly’s executions began 
circulating in the British press, the London Evening Standard carried a lengthy article 
recounting Stoddart’s career. The article concluded: 
Deeply devout in his principles and conduct, unshaken under his severe 
trials, and even acknowledging in then a spiritual blessing, after a short but 
eventful career, his arduous duties are closed at the age of 36, beloved and 
mourned, not only by his relations, but by a large circle of friends, as a 
sincere Christian, and a soldier devoted to his Sovereign and country.1 
 
Such favorable depictions, of which there were many in the press coverage of Stoddart 
and Conolly’s imprisonment and execution, were not merely intended to heighten the 
tragedy of their deaths. On the contrary, newspaper articles uniformly portrayed both men 
as loyal citizens, moral men, and devout Christians, characterizations that were integral to 
the development of a sense of the British government’s responsibility for their well-
being. Non-newspaper sources indicate that some information on the men’s characters 
was excluded from the press accounts with the intention of strengthening the argument 
for a governmental obligation toward them. Nevertheless, the information that did see 
publication in the press was reinforced by other contemporary sources on the crisis, 
particularly Wolff’s and Grover’s publications. This chapter, then, will examine the 
construction of Stoddart’s and Conolly’s characters in the press in order to understand the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 London Evening Standard, 9 February 1843. 
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role these descriptions played in press analysis of the government’s responsibility toward 
them. 
 Newspaper articles about the early days of the crisis (prior to any suggestion that 
Stoddart and Conolly might have been executed) generally mention character traits while 
discussing the most recent information about the officers’ captivity, rather than as an 
independent point of interest for readers or as an explicit attack on the government’s 
handling of the situation. An early instance of this occurred in July of 1840, when reports 
began circulating in the press that the Russian government had attempted to secure 
Stoddart’s release from Bukhara. Stoddart’s Russian advocate was a general then leading 
a military assault against the khanate of Khiva. Aware that Russia and Britain were 
competing for influence in Central Asia, Stoddart refused his assistance. According to 
one version of the events, he reasoned that “if his own countrymen would not liberate 
him he would not be indebted to strangers.”2 Although the author of the article did not 
reinforce this quotation explicitly with his own evaluation of the government’s treatment 
of Stoddart, later articles about the same incident suggest an implicit agreement with 
Stoddart’s criticism, describing Stoddart’s behavior as “patriotic.”3 Other articles 
published before Stoddart’s death became public knowledge use similar language; the 
Norfolk Chronicle, for example, described him as a “gallant and meritorious officer.”4  
Such portrayals contrasted sharply with the emir’s treatment of him (and of 
Conolly, who was imprisoned with Stoddart in Bukhara from December of 1841), also 
frequently discussed in the press. According to the London Evening Standard, for 
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!! 18 
example, the emir compelled Stoddart to help him prepare the city of Bukhara for a 
possible invasion during the Russian march on Khiva by sending men to dig a grave 
outside the door of his prison cell, with the message that the grave would be Stoddart’s if 
he failed to cooperate.5 Another report suggested that Stoddart had been exhibited in the 
Bukharan bazaar “for the bigoted Mahomedans to spit upon.”6 Perhaps the gravest insult 
came with the reports that Stoddart, who had travelled to Bukhara to secure the freedom 
of the emirate’s slaves, had himself been pressed into slavery by the emir, and was 
helping to strengthen the Bukharan military.7 When asked about the truth of these rumors 
in the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston (who was Foreign Secretary when they first 
appeared in 1840) confirmed that the government believed them to be true, and his 
response was widely reported in the press.8 The wide circulation these reports enjoyed 
presaged the later, more developed orientalism of the ethnological observations Wolff 
made during his journey to and stay in Bukhara (addressed in a subsequent chapter).  
Following Stoddart and Conolly’s execution, newspapers articles about their fate 
praised their character and Christianity more explicitly and therefore relied less on the 
sort of implicit contrasts mentioned above. For example, one early report of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s deaths adopted a nearly hagiographic tone in its description of the importance 
of Conolly’s moral character in enabling both men to endure imprisonment in Bukhara: 
Well was it for Arthur Conolly that he had long accustomed his mind to 
lean for support on the never failing prop of Christian faith in every 
exigency. Well was it for Stoddart, that in the hour of his greatest need, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 London Evening Standard, 24 March 1840. 
6 London Evening Standard, 24 March 1840; Falmouth Express and Colonial Journal, 18 
January 1840. 
7 See for example Morning Chronicle, 28 March 1840. 
8 See for example Morning Chronicle, 28 March 1840; Morning Post, 28 March 1840; 
London Evening Standard, 28 March 1840; The Champion, 29 March 1840. 
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friend should, in so unlooked for a manner, have been raised up to sustain 
his drooping spirit, and animate him afresh for the fearful conflict between 
human frailty and Christian duty.9 
 
The Morning Chronicle was not the only paper to carry this report, which it attributed to 
the Delhi Gazette, and which circulated in other papers in Britain as well.10 
 Stoddart, too, received numerous commendations in the press as a man of devout 
Christian faith, as the quotation with which this chapter began suggests. Nevertheless, 
even before news of the executions began to circulate, newspapers printed articles stating 
that Stoddart had actually converted to Islam during his imprisonment in Bukhara. In 
some cases, this report occasioned remarkably little concern. One version stated, for 
example, that as of the spring or early summer of 1840, Stoddart had been released from 
prison, “and save doing penance as a Mussulman, is comfortable enough.”11 Subsequent 
commentary on this event (which neither anyone in the press, nor Grover, nor Wolff 
contested) took a far less casual approach. The same article that described the support 
Conolly offered to Stoddart also called on readers not to condemn Stoddart for his 
wavering faith, reminding them that the conversion was forced, and that his decision to 
value life above faith was natural, if not commendable. In any case, this article observed, 
Stoddart’s lapse was momentary: he later renounced the forced conversion and returned 
to Christianity.12  
 In addition to describing his faith, many newspaper articles lauded Stoddart’s 
character more generally. According to one article, his “mental requirements, his nobility 
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of soul, his generous chivalry, aided by his commanding stature and soldierly bearing” 
collectively served to make him a well-like and well-respected figure in Persia when he 
served as an envoy there.13 The Cambridge Chronicle and Journal delved even further 
into his past, stating that he “was a favourite not only among his school fellows of his 
own years, but of his seniors.”14 
 This emphasis on Christianity and morality (including patriotism) developed in 
the context of early Victorian British religion. Victoria came to the British throne in 
1837, and Stoddart and Conolly arrived in Bukhara shortly thereafter, as a wave of 
evangelical fervor was transforming England. Originating in the early eighteenth century 
Methodist movement begun by the Wesley brothers, by the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century evangelicalism had influenced both the Anglican Church and 
Nonconformists (Protestant Christian non-Anglicans) alike.15 Across all denominations, 
Victorian evangelicalism emphasized a dual focus on one’s own conversion and the 
evangelism of others.16 Evangelicals valued the influence of faith on the individual’s 
character and private life, but also emphasized the need to share one’s faith and allow it 
to impact public choices. As a result, the Victorian period saw the rise of numerous 
organizations and movements to address social ills, including the mistreatment of factory 
workers, the frequently unacceptable housing conditions of the poor, alcoholism, and 
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perhaps most notably, slavery and the slave trade.17 These causes also found 
representation in Parliament, where many evangelicals were liberal Tories who 
championed a variety of economic and social causes, including free trade and the 
abolition of the slave trade and slavery.18 Among the most famous evangelical 
Parliamentarians was William Wilberforce, one of the leaders of the abolition 
campaign.19 Evangelicalism was also represented in the Victorian military, and the 
Victorian hymnody demonstrates the church’s willingness to use martial metaphors to 
describe it mission in the world. For many Victorian military men, the metaphor extended 
beyond hymns sung on Sunday morning, and into their real responsibilities as soldiers.20  
 The movement to abolish the slave trade and slavery had particular significance 
for Stoddart and Conolly, both of whom travelled to Central Asia in part to encourage 
local rulers to release some portion at least of their enslaved populations. The anti-slavery 
movement was not a long-established cause in Britain when they were given their 
assignments; in fact, although the slave trade had been outlawed in 1807, Parliament only 
abolished slavery itself in 1833, five years before Stoddart arrived in Bukhara. Early 
generations of the British abolition movement recognized that the slavery practiced 
around the Atlantic Ocean differed significantly from the slavery practiced around the 
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Indian Ocean, for example, or in Central Asia.21 Despite these differences, the 1830s saw 
the increasingly powerful abolitionist movement demanding that all forms of slavery be 
universally condemned. This more comprehensive view of all slavery as morally wrong 
was advocated with particular force at the World Anti-Slavery Convention, which was 
held in London during the summer of 1840.22 Unifying this position and its earlier 
counterpart was the conviction that slavery in any form was a moral blight in the British 
Empire. Abolition therefore benefitted not only the enslaved, who presumably wished for 
freedom, but also the enslavers and their rulers, who were ultimately responsible for 
perpetuating slavery’s moral evils.23 
 However, when in 1838 the British envoy in Tehran, Sir John McNeill, received 
instructions to send an officer to Bukhara to address the situation of that country’s 
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enslaved population, the motivation was not a sense of moral outrage. We will consider 
the political significance of Bukhara’s slaves in the Anglo-Russian Great Game rivalry 
over Central Asia in the next chapter. For now, it is important to note that in his written 
instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stoddart, McNeill acknowledged the British 
government’s support for universal abolition. Nevertheless, “considerations of 
humanity…would alone be insufficient to induce the Ruler of Bokhara to depart in this 
respect from the customs of his country.”24 Rather, Stoddart was to explain to the emir 
the threat of Russian invasion, and to rely on his self-interest to secure the slaves’ release. 
McNeill made it clear that Britain’s concern for the situation was no less self-interested 
than he expected the emir’s to be; he instructed Stoddart not only to attempt to secure the 
release of the Russian slaves, but also to emphasize the benefits of British rule in 
comparison to Russian. Muslim states enjoyed far greater freedom under British control 
than under Russian, McNeill argued, and therefore the emir would be wise to court 
British influence rather than facing the risks of a Russian invasion.25 
 Thus although it might seem reasonable to assume that Stoddart’s mission 
developed out of British moral outrage over slavery and the slave trade, McNeill’s 
instructions to Stoddart make it clear that the primary motivation was in fact the political 
advantage of the British Empire in the region. The few details Grover offers regarding 
Stoddart’s Christian faith are insufficient to determine the extent to which Stoddart 
personally believed in the cause of abolition.26  
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Conolly, on the other hand, was personally a devoted abolitionist and in fact a 
friend of William Wilberforce—a fact that tends to corroborate the characterizations of 
him that appeared in the press during his imprisonment and after his execution.27 He had 
joined the East India Company at the age of sixteen, and had since devoted much of his 
energy to plans to eradicate slavery in Central Asia, believing that its eradication (along 
with the bringing of Christianity and “civilization” to Asia) should be one of Britain’s 
primary imperial aims. John William Kaye, who published a series of biographical essays 
entitled Lives of Indian Officers, included Conolly among his subjects as an indication of 
the influence the individual moral character of a British officer might have in India.28  
Not content to contribute indirectly to the abolition of slavery in the British 
Empire, Conolly sought to play an active part in it. Having travelled in Central Asia for 
the first time in 1830,29 he requested to be sent to Turkestan a second time in 1838, on 
this occasion with the specific intention of inducing the region’s rulers to abandon the 
slave trade.30 Although his proposal met with early approval, the plans were reconsidered 
in the light of Russia’s failed 1839 expedition to Khiva, which caused British 
involvement in Central Asia to appear temporarily less urgent.31 Eventually, however, 
Conolly secured permission to travel to Khiva and Khoqand. His orders were to 
strengthen ties between the British and the khanates and between the two khanates 
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themselves. He was granted permission to travel to Bukhara if other efforts to secure 
Stoddart’s release failed, and if it seemed likely that his presence there would be useful.32 
Of course Conolly did travel to Bukhara at Stoddart’s request, only to join him in 
prison days after his arrival there. In light of his failure to achieve the goals of his 
mission, it is worth noting one argument which the press scrupulously avoided making in 
favor of the government’s obligations toward Stoddart and Conolly: the argument that 
they were skilled diplomats making valuable contributions to British policy on Central 
Asia. In fact, there is strong evidence to the contrary for both officers. Captain Grover, 
who knew Stoddart personally, stated that, in his opinion, Stoddart was temperamentally 
very poorly suited to diplomatic work, being “a man of impulse, with no more power of 
self-control than an infant.”33 Evidence from the India Office Records dating to 
Stoddart’s service under British envoy John McNeill in Persia anecdotally confirms 
this.34 In late 1837, Ali Mahomed Beg, a Persian working for the British government, was 
detained between Herat to Tehran, and taken to the nearby Persian camp, where Stoddart 
was then staying. Hearing of the situation, Stoddart immediately marched to the tent of 
the Persian Prime Minister, where he asked Ali Mahomed, in front of an assembled 
company of breakfasting dignitaries, where his seized baggage was being held. Learning 
that it was in the tent of a Persian official called Hajee Khan, Stoddart entered into what 
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poor Ali Mahomed described later as an “altercation” with that official. Hajee Khan then 
ordered Ali Mahomed to be seized and confined, and released him only after 
interrogating and threatening to kill him.  
The incident inspired a spate of correspondence between Sir John McNeill, 
Palmerston, and the Persian authorities. McNeill narrowly avoided having to sever 
diplomatic relations with the Shah completely because of it. Stoddart seems to have 
escaped relatively unscathed, in spite of Persian calls that McNeill “inflict severe 
punishment” on his agent.35 The only indication that the episode affected Stoddart’s 
career occurs in McNeill’s instructions to him regarding the mission to Bukhara. In them, 
he urged Stoddart “to guard against that proneness to take offence where no insult was 
offered or intended,” as, McNeill observed, many Europeans were too quick to take 
offence at the behavior of Asian populations, with whose customs they were generally 
unfamiliar.36 Nowhere does McNeill hint at any reluctance to send such a potentially 
volatile officer alone on a diplomatic mission.  
Conolly struggled to achieve success as a diplomat not because of a fiery temper, 
but because of his idealistic vision for Central Asia under British influence. His 
biographer, John William Kaye, wrote, in an essay about Conolly that bordered on 
hagiography, that Conolly believed the British invasion of Afghanistan to be more “a 
grand Anti-Slavery Crusade than…a political movement, intended to check-mate the 
designs of another great European power.”37 Alexander Burnes, an officer of the East 
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India Company who had travelled extensively in Central Asia and Afghanistan, took a 
distinctly skeptical view of Conolly’s moral ambitions for British influence there. Captain 
Conolly was a likeable man, he wrote, but “flighty,” and overly optimistic about British 
prospects in Central Asia. “[H]e is to regenerate Toorkistan, dismiss all the slaves, and 
looks upon our advent as a design of Providence to spread Christianity,” according to 
Burnes.38 Burnes repeatedly expressed astonishment that Conolly was permitted to 
undertake the mission that led to his arrival in Bukhara.39 M.E. Yapp has argued that the 
latter’s success in recruiting support for his mission was the result of great personal 
religious conviction and charisma, and described him as, in this regard at least, an 
historical version of Dostoevsky’s fictional hero Alexei Karamazov.40 
Although Conolly succeeded in gaining support for his diplomatic ventures 
among British officials, he was far less successful in obtaining the support of the Central 
Asian rulers to whom he was sent. Conolly was the third officer the British sent to 
Central Asia on an anti-slavery commission. The second, Lieutenant Richmond 
Shakespear, was sent to Khiva when it appeared that the first such envoy, Captain James 
Abbott, had failed in his mission to secure the release of the city’s Russian slaves.41 
Shakespear succeeded where Abbot had failed, and led a caravan of freed Russian slaves 
out of Khiva and back to Russia.42 Conolly’s brief extended beyond the release of 
Russian slaves to the total abolition of slavery, in addition to which he was to encourage 
the khanates of Khiva and Khoqand and the emirate of Bukhara to abandon their 
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longstanding rivalry in the face of the Russian threat. Neither the khan of Khiva nor the 
khan of Khoqand mistreated Conolly, but they wanted no part of his mission.43 In fact, 
Conolly’s only lasting contribution to British position and policy in Central Asia was the 
coining of the term “the Great Game,” by which the Anglo-Russian rivalry over the 
region is still known.44 
Neither anything resembling Burnes’s criticism of Conolly, nor any hint of the 
debacle involving Stoddart and Hajee Khan, ever made their way into the press. 
Newspapers also largely avoided reporting the events of Stoddart’s arrival in Bukhara, 
which, like the Hajee Khan incident, reflected poorly on his diplomatic skill. On the rare 
occasion that a newspaper decided to print the story of Stoddart’s entry into Bukhara, the 
commentary attempted to justify his behavior by caustically satirizing the demands of 
Bukharan etiquette. According to one article that adopted this approach, when Stoddart 
first met the emir, he failed to realize that “it was imperative on all mounted bipeds to 
alight from their horses and do obeisance to the relative of the sun, moon, and stars (in 
what degree of consanguinity I am not able to learn).”45 If Stoddart’s fatal mistake was to 
fail to conform to such patently absurd requirements, then his imprisonment would have 
seemed correspondingly unreasonable. 
However, both Grover and Nikolai Khanikoff, a member of a Russian diplomatic 
mission that visited Bukhara during Stoddart and Conolly’s imprisonment, provide 
accounts of Stoddart’s behavior on his arrival in Bukhara. Their reports suggest that he 
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repeatedly violated Bukharan customs.46 Stoddart arrived safely in Bukhara on December 
17th, 1838, and proceeded immediately to a brief and somewhat tense interview with the 
Bukharan vizier.47 On the following day, the vizier asked Stoddart to return for a second 
interview. This Stoddart refused to do, stating that in his own country, the vizier would be 
expected to return his visit before asking him to make another.48 The following morning, 
the first day of Ramadan, Stoddart received a message saying that the emir wished to 
speak with him, and that he should go to the Registan (the central square of the city) and 
wait for further instructions there.49 Stoddart did so, but contrary to instructions remained 
defiantly on horseback when the emir appeared, and made no other acknowledgement of 
his presence than a military salute. According to Grover, the emir stared briefly, and did 
not engage Stoddart in conversation.50 He later sent a message requesting an explanation 
of Stoddart’s behavior, which Stoddart once again justified as in keeping with English 
customs. “The Ameer then sent to say,” Grover reports, “that he was perfectly satisfied 
with his conduct; and invited him immediately to come to the palace.”51 
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 Stoddart continued to insist on conforming to British rather than Bukharan custom 
once he arrived in the emir’s palace. He objected sharply when a member of the court 
asked if he wished to make “servile supplications” to the emir.52 He shook off the 
attendants who, according to Bukharan custom, would have accompanied him into the 
emir’s presence when he was presented to the court, out of a fear that they would compel 
him to bow or prostrate himself in front of the emir. When he pulled away from the 
attendants, a nearby official began to suspect him of concealing a weapon with which he 
might injure the emir. Stoddart hit the man when he attempted to search his clothing, and 
rushed in to speak with the emir alone. Despite this extraordinary sequence of events, 
Stoddart left the emir’s palace confident in his position in Bukhara, and, according to the 
Russian diplomat Nikolai Khanikoff, spent the remainder of the day locating addresses of 
the Russian slaves he hoped to free.53 On the following day, however, Stoddart was 
summoned back into the presence of the vizier, where he was immediately arrested, 
threatened with execution, and imprisoned.54 Later that night, Stoddart was transported to 
a dry well, in which he was imprisoned with two thieves and a murderer, and where he 
stayed for approximately two months.55  
 It seems likely that newspapers omitted this narrative, as well as the Hajee Khan 
incident and Conolly’s excessive idealism, from their accounts of the tragedy as a means 
of protecting the officers’ character. Seen in the light of Stoddart’s repeated blunt refusal 
to conform to Bukharan social norms, the emir’s behavior seemed far less unpredictable 
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than it might if Stoddart were the reasonable, well-liked man the papers portrayed. 
Unflattering evidence of this kind might weaken the argument in favor of government 
intervention in Stoddart and Conolly’s fate, and therefore had no part in the press’ largely 
positive depictions of the officers. In describing both officers, therefore, the papers 
printed only reports and descriptions that tended to portray both men as Christians and 
loyal ambassadors of the empire. 
 The translation of these characterizations into explicit calls for government action 
was only partial in the early stages of the crisis; a coherent and unified appeal to the 
government only emerged when Captain Grover assumed the role of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s primary advocate in Britain. Nevertheless, the groundwork for this transition 
was laid both in public sentiment generally and in the specific terms of the newspapers’ 
reporting on Stoddart and Conolly prior to Grover’s involvement.  
The key development in public sentiment, like many other social shifts influential 
in the early years of the Stoddart and Conolly affair, originated in the rise of Victorian 
evangelicalism. Among the innovations of this movement was a new sense of national 
honor that embraced social, economic, and foreign policy under Victoria’s rule. The role 
of national or imperial honor in ending slavery in Britain has already been discussed. 
Boyd Hilton, in his history of late Hanoverian British economic thought, addresses the 
economic aspect of this national honor, which emphasized “frugality, professionalism, 
and financial rectitude.”56 Peter van der Veer distinguishes between Victorian economic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Hilton, The Age of Atonement, 7. 
!! 32 
policy and this sense of national honor, however, suggesting that the latter extended 
beyond the former.57 
 Though rare at this early stage in the crisis, calls for government intervention in 
Stoddart and Conolly’s fate do exist which explicitly connect the officers’ character to 
the government’s responsibility toward them. One article, carried in both the Evening 
Chronicle and the Morning Chronicle and apparently taken from the Delhi Gazette, 
argues that: 
[a]s Christians, we have grounds for thankfulness that the honour of our 
religion has been thus upheld by to such worthy votaries; but, as 
Englishmen, how humiliating that a petty barbarian of Central Asia should 
thus presume to set at nought our power—that he should triumph 
unpunished—that they should perish unavenged.58 
 
This was not the only occasion on which a paper called for military intervention on 
Stoddart and Conolly’s behalf, but, as the next chapter will show, such calls tended to 
occur more frequently among papers that supported British military involvement in other 
parts of Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan.  
 Both papers that advocated military engagement and those that did not observed 
closely the government’s own commentary on its proper role in obtaining Stoddart and 
Conolly’s release. When a member of the House of Commons enquired about the 
government’s progress in negotiating with the emir, Palmerston indicated that all efforts 
had failed up to that point. Both Palmerston’s rhetoric and his questioner’s reflected the 
way in which the question had been discussed in the press. Monckton Milnes, who 
prompted Palmerston to discuss Stoddart and Conolly on this occasion, described 
Stoddart as “gallant” and inquired into the government’s progress on fulfilling its promise !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to secure his release.59 Palmerston observed in his reply that the treatment Stoddart had 
received from Emir Nasrullah was unjustifiably harsh, and that his refusal of Russian 
assistance was “very honourabl[e] and nobl[e].”60 Some press accounts of this exchange 
report Milnes’s question in far more sharply worded terms than the official account of the 
parliamentary proceedings for that day records. According to the Morning Chronicle, for 
example, Milnes described Stoddart as having been subjected to the “grossest 
indignities,” and compelled to accept the status of a slave.61 Whether or not they included 
these harsh words attributed to Milnes, accounts of parliamentary discussion about 
Stoddart and Conolly’s fate enjoyed wide circulation in the press, indicating that even 
those papers that did not call for military intervention in the crisis nevertheless inclined to 
the view that the government had some responsibility for the officers. 
 Early discussion of the Stoddart and Conolly affair, therefore, was littered with 
references to Stoddart and Conolly’s personal character as devout Christians and men of 
character whose loyal service to the empire merited praise. Much of what the press 
reported was corroborated by other sources, although these other sources also indicate 
that some information was omitted from the press reports, leaving Victorian readers with 
a much more favorable impression of the officers’ contribution to British policy in 
Central Asia (and in Stoddart’s case, of his character as well) than these other sources 
could confirm. While these flattering depictions did not always appear in the immediate 
context of a call for direct government interference in their fate at Bukhara, they 
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capitalized on the unique sense of national honor that evangelicalism had inculcated into 
British society, and made government intervention in the crisis appear highly desirable. 
 While the discussion of Stoddart and Conolly’s character and Christian identity 
was frequently associated with only an implicit call for government action, discussion of 
Britain’s military involvement in Central Asia tended to produce much more explicit 
discussion of the government’s responsibility toward the officers. Not only did some 
papers demand military action on Stoddart and Conolly’s behalf, but they also actually 
accused the government of causing the officers’ deaths by implementing a misguided 
policy in Afghanistan. This political context of the Stoddart and Conolly affair, and its 
implications for the press’ understanding of the government’s role in resolving the 
situation, will be the topic of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two:  
Political Pawns: The Impact of the First Anglo-Afghan War 
 
In January of 1843, the Newcastle Journal decried a “criminal policy” enacted by 
the British government that had “caused the name—the hitherto respected name—of 
Englishman, to be execrated…and every enemy of the British name to be received with 
open arms.”1 The policy in question was the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1839 in 
order to create a buffer state friendly to Britain between India and Russia. Its dramatic 
failure and the subsequent expulsion of the British from Afghanistan had implications 
stretching far beyond Afghanistan. The initial success of the First Anglo-Afghan War 
(1838-1842) provided what some considered an opportunity to secure Stoddart and 
Conolly’s release, but this was followed by a catastrophe that played a role in the 
officers’ deaths. Conolly himself, in the prison journal he kept at the end of his life, 
traced the beginning of his and Stoddart’s final fall from the emir’s favor to the arrival of 
news regarding the collapse of British authority in Afghanistan.2 As this chapter will 
show, the press widely viewed Stoddart and Conolly’s fate as a product of British failure 
in Afghanistan; indeed, conservative-leaning papers that opposed British interference in 
Afghanistan blamed the British government, rather than the Bukharan emir, for the 
officers’ death precisely because of the failure of the Afghan invasion. 
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In order to understand the rationale behind British involvement in Afghanistan 
(and indeed in Bukhara itself), it is necessary to understand that throughout the 1820s and 
1830s, Britain was becoming increasingly fearful of Russia’s intentions toward its Indian 
empire. William Moorcroft, an East India Company veterinarian charged with the care of 
the Company’s cavalry horses, and possibly the first British visitor to Bukhara since the 
late Middle Ages, wrote frequent reports about the Russian presence in Central Asia. 
Although he admitted that it was a commercial presence, he recognized the ease with 
which the Russian military might become involved. As a result, he repeatedly warned the 
British government to guard India’s northwestern frontier, which he feared would 
become the Russian entrance into India from Central Asia and Afghanistan.3 Moorcroft’s 
concern was not mere alarmism, as Russian trade with Central Asia had increased 
dramatically since the beginning of the nineteenth century.4 Nor was he alone in his 
concern. In October 1829, Colonel de Lacy Evans published a book entitled 
Practicability of an Invasion of British India, alerting the government to the possibility of 
invasion from the northwest.5 Although this work was not consistently well received, the 
following January Ellenborough authored a dispatch inspired by it, similarly proposing a 
plausible threat to British India through Central Asia.6 
In general, British Central Asian policy of this period rejected conquest in favor 
of economic influence, though military control was never entirely eliminated as a 
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possibility.7 Iran, ideally, would serve as a barrier insulating India from Russian 
aggression but as British influence declined there in the late 1830s, this role was 
increasingly ascribed to Afghanistan.8 By the late 1830s, Afghanistan had developed into 
a region of particular concern, menaced by both Persia (particularly at Herat in the west) 
and Russia.9 Foreign Secretary Palmerston (1841-1846) and Prime Minister Melbourne 
agreed that control over Afghanistan was vital to Britain’s Indian interests, and that either 
Britain or Russia would eventually control Afghanistan completely.10  
As a result, a plan was developed to oust Afghanistan’s current ruler, Dost 
Muhammad, and replace him with Shah Shuja, the grandson of a former Afghan ruler.11 
Not all thought this a wise course of action, however, including the eventual British 
envoy to Shah Shuja’s court, Alexander Burnes. Burnes had stayed in Kabul for extended 
periods and had reported frequently during that time that Dost Muhammad was eager to 
develop a lasting relationship with the British government. For example, when a Russian 
soldier, Captain Vickovich, appeared in Kabul, Dost Muhammad asked Burnes how (or 
if) the British would have him received. Burnes recommended the Russian be welcomed, 
but also that the British be made aware of his intentions, with which request Dost 
Muhammad willingly complied.12 Burnes advocated that the British not replace Dost 
Muhammad, but instead work closely with him to keep Russian influence at bay in 
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Nevertheless, Burnes and other experts in the region predicted that if the British 
chose to replace Dost Muhammad with Shah Shuja, they would have little trouble doing 
so.13 The Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, preferred this course of action to 
attempting to work with Dost Muhammad because of the animosity that existed between 
Maharajah Ranjit Singh, an established British ally ruling over a Sikh kingdom in the 
Punjab, and Dost Muhammad.14 In order to avoid jeopardizing Britain’s relationship with 
Ranjit Singh, Auckland chose to court his support for British involvement in Afghanistan 
by proposing that they work together to replace Dost Muhammad with Shah Shuja, to 
whom Ranjit Singh objected less.15 Thus, the summer of 1838 was spent in arranging 
treaties between Britain, Shah Shuja, and Ranjit Singh in advance of the invasion of 
Afghanistan.16 In the initial plans for the invasion of Afghanistan proposed by the British, 
Britain contributed only an officer corps and advisors to Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja. 
However, from the earliest negotiations with Ranjit, Macnaghten acknowledged that 
Britain might be willing to take a more active part in the invasion, and the maharajah 
consistently pushed for as much British involvement as possible.17  
As the Army of the Indus (as the invasion force was known) prepared for the 
march to Kabul, rumors began circulating to the effect that the tsar was preparing to 
launch an expedition to Khiva and Bukhara.18 It was under these circumstances that Lord 
Palmerston instructed Sir John McNeill, the British envoy to Persia, to send an agent to 
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Bukhara to apprise the emir of Russian intentions, and to do anything possible to forestall 
a Russian invasion. McNeill chose Stoddart for the task, as Stoddart had successfully 
represented McNeill and the British government to the shah’s court during the Persian 
siege of Herat (eastern Afghanistan) in the summer of 1838, and was therefore not too far 
distant from Bukhara.19 On instruction from Palmerston, McNeill had directed Stoddart 
to inform the shah that if Persian forces succeeded in taking Herat, Britain would be 
forced to declare war against Persia. The shah agreed to withdraw his forces, and in a 
letter to Palmerston, McNeill observed that Stoddart had executed his mission 
particularly well.20 
In the previous chapter, I described Stoddart’s entry into Bukhara and his 
numerous altercations with the Bukharan emir, Nasrullah, and his officials, which 
resulted in his arrest and imprisonment. While Stoddart was confined in the bug-infested 
well that the emir used to imprison particularly nefarious criminals, the Army of the 
Indus was marching toward Kabul. The logistical challenges of the trek were enormous: 
alpine passes impeded the progress of the troops and accompanying supplies, and local 
rulers demanded large bribes to allow them to continue on their way.21 To make matters 
worse, camels, rather than ponies, had been purchased as the primary pack animals. Ill-
suited to the steep terrain and frequently unable to differentiate the poisonous from 
nonpoisonous among the unfamiliar herbage, many of the camels died early in the 
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invasion.22 The British officer corps of the mission had prepared more for a military 
parade than for an invasion, as some of the junior officers had brought as many as forty 
servants with them.23  
Notwithstanding initial difficulties, the first phase of the Afghan conquest 
succeeded when Shah Shuja was able to claim the city of Kandahar, then under the 
control of a brother of Dost Muhammad, without violence. The city’s ruler fled as the 
Army of the Indus approached, and its citizens welcomed the shah and his forces.24 The 
next city, Ghazni, proved more difficult. A small team placed explosive charges on the 
city’s gates, thus gaining the army entrance into the city. In the ensuing battle, the British 
sustained fewer than two hundred casualties and gained significant food stores, while the 
city’s defenders suffered over five hundred deaths.25 Dost Muhammad struggled to rally 
his forces following the British victory at Ghazni. By the beginning of July, 1839, Shah 
Shuja and the Army of the Indus were at Kabul. Like Kandahar, Kabul surrendered 
without a struggle.26 
The first suggestions of British military intervention in Stoddart’s fate date to this 
period, when the British occupation of Afghanistan seemed most likely to succeed. 
Macnaghten himself, having crossed the Indus to invade Afghanistan, advocated crossing 
the Oxus as well, in order to invade Bukhara and secure Stoddart’s release. A mere 
brigade, he argued, of the Army of the Indus’s forces in Afghanistan would be sufficient 
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for the task.27 His proposal never gained support in the military,28 but some in the press 
believed that an invasion of Bukhara was desirable not only to achieve Stoddart’s release, 
but also to advance Britain’s standing in the region. The Wexford Conservative, for 
example, suggested that before any such plan could be considered, Britain and her allies 
needed to strengthen their hold on Afghanistan; having done so, they should invade 
Bukhara promptly. In this view, decisive action against Emir Nasrullah in response to his 
treatment of Stoddart and Conolly would inspire Britain’s allies and demonstrate her 
power to her enemies, as well as fulfilling the government’s obligation to seek justice for 
her abused envoy.29 The Morning Post was more skeptical of the government’s ability to 
compel Nasrullah to release Stoddart, and described the means at British disposal to force 
his cooperation as limited.30 At the beginning of February of 1841, an article circulated 
widely in the press indicating that Macnaghten’s plans had been rejected, and that the 
Army of the Indus would not invade Bukhara to secure Stoddart’s release.31 
There were several avenues by which the press might have obtained information 
of this type regarding British foreign policy. Personal connections between government 
officials and individual journalists were one of the most powerful keys to accessing 
information about British Foreign affairs in the early nineteenth century.32 Other sources 
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of information in London included government offices, official documents, and gossip.33 
Information on Stoddart and Conolly from non-domestic sources was even more difficult 
to acquire, however. The telegraph only began to be used for transmitting international 
news in the 1850s, well after the Stoddart and Conolly crisis had ended, and was even 
slower to impact the transmission of news from outside the West.34 Non-official news 
from distant Bukhara therefore took weeks or months to reach London, and often no 
longer accurately portrayed Stoddart and Conolly’s state by the time it appeared in 
British newspapers.35 A more fundamental problem was that no newspaper had a foreign 
correspondent in Bukhara, and therefore the press was entirely dependent on government 
information and on information about Bukhara gathered by correspondents in other 
cities.36 
It is frequently difficult to discern which of these sources a given article about 
Stoddart and Conolly might have used. In general, only those articles that recounted 
parliamentary debates explicitly stated the origin of the information they contained, 
though foreign correspondents were also mentioned occasionally.37 It is therefore almost 
impossible to determine, for example, how the author of the article cited above as stating 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers, 170. 
34 Newspapers Politics, and English Society, 221. 
35 The most striking example of this was Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths, which occurred 
on or around 17 June 1842. More than three months later, Stoddart and Conolly were still 
described as the “present captives” of the Bukharan emir in the press (London Evening 
Standard, 7 October 1842). Only in January of 1843 did reports of their execution begin 
to appear in the press; see for example London Evening Standard, 16 January 1843. 
36 For instance, a newspaper correspondent living in Constantinople was the source of 
one early report that Stoddart and Conolly had been executed. Derbyshire Courier, 21 
January 1843. 
37 See for example Morning Chronicle, 16 February 1843 and Essex Standard, 20 
January 1843. 
! 43 
that Britain would not invade Bukhara via Afghanistan obtained his information.38 The 
same may be said for the vast majority of articles written about Stoddart and Conolly 
prior to Grover’s involvement in the crisis, after which time a large number of articles on 
the topic identify him as the source of the information.39 
However Britain’s disinclination to invade Bukhara may have become known to 
the press, there was no such certainty regarding Russia’s intentions in the region. In 
October of 1839, reports of a Russian expedition bound for the khanate of Khiva, which 
bordered Bukhara, reached Kabul and deeply troubled the leaders of the occupying force 
there.40 The Russian force justified its attack on Khiva by announcing its intention to 
liberate enslaved Russians. This was precisely the argument British leaders had feared 
Russia would make in reference to an attack on Bukhara. The expedition leaders also 
proclaimed their desire to render the trade routes safer, and to reinforce the strength of 
Russian economic influence in the region.41  
In fact, Russian intentions seem to have extended beyond the ambitions they 
proclaimed publically. In early March of 1840, Russian Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode 
acknowledged that Russia had aimed to replace the Khivan khan with his brother.42 
Russia’s avowed purposes alone were sufficient to alarm Macnaghten, however, who 
considered sending a force to meet the Russians.43 His superiors told him repeatedly to 
focus his efforts on securing Shah Shuja’s power in Kabul, rather than sending forces to 
attempt to meet the Russian threat. Auckland allowed him to demand an explanation from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 London Evening Standard, 6 February 1841. 
39 See for example Morning Post, 29 July 1844. 
40 Norris, The First Afghan War, 297. 
41 Ibid., 306. 
42 Ibid., 310. 
43 Ibid., 306. 
! 44 
the Russian forces by sending a representative to them, but sending an armed force was 
out of the question.44 The Russian expedition to Khiva failed, however, overcome by an 
unusually cold steppe winter, and was forced to retreat to the Russian base at Orenburg 
significantly depleted.45  
As long as the Russian forces advanced toward Khiva, the Bukharan emir, 
Nasrullah, feared that Russia might invade Bukhara as well. In response to this threat, he 
released Stoddart from prison and assigned him the task of recruiting men into the 
Bukharan artillery. As I noted in the previous chapter, this event caused an outcry in the 
British press, and many papers carried articles expressing horror at the thought of a 
British diplomat enslaved by the ruler of another country. The issue was raised in 
Parliament as well, where Foreign Secretary Palmerston condemned Nasrullah’s 
treatment of Stoddart. Contemporary newspaper reports dating to the end of March added 
that the emir demanded Stoddart choose between this and execution.46 In Parliament, 
Palmerston himself confirmed that Stoddart had entered the emir’s service.47 Despite the 
furor this incident generated, Stoddart’s new position as a recruiter for the emir’s artillery 
was evidence of his temporarily increased status at the Bukharan court, and some 
newspapers reported in this light.48 
The Russian advance on Khiva thus inadvertently benefitted Stoddart by 
encouraging Nasrullah to exploit his talents in anticipation of a possible Russian attack. 
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Stoddart’s benefit, and therefore sent a message to the emir of Bukhara when he arrived 
outside of Khiva, demanding Stoddart’s release. Although much of British policy in 
Central Asia and Afghanistan was intended to limit the threat Russia posed in the region, 
the two countries were not at war, and still cooperated on some issues. The previous 
chapter noted that Stoddart rejected Russian assistance in this case, to great acclaim in the 
British press. However, M.E. Yapp, who has written extensively on the history of modern 
South Asia and the Near East, has argued that the emir would have refused to release 
Stoddart even had he been disposed to accept Russian assistance.49  
It is certainly true that Nasrullah refused to allow Stoddart and Conolly (who had 
joined Stoddart in Bukhara in December of 1841) to leave Bukhara two years later, when 
Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Butenev requested that they accompany his diplomatic 
mission back to Russia, and then proceed to England.50 This mission had arrived in 
Bukhara during the summer of 1841, in response to the emir’s request that a team of 
Russian geologists evaluate his country’s natural reserves.51 The Russian Supervisor of 
the Mining Engineers Corps instructed the team to learn as much as possible about 
regional trade and prices, with the objective of strengthening Russian commercial 
presence there,52 and if possible, to seek Stoddart and Conolly’s release.53 Butenev’s 
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mission had too little power in Bukhara to secure this final objective, however, and 
departed Bukhara without Stoddart and Conolly in April of 1842.54 
The next international episode to influence Stoddart and Conolly’s treatment in 
Bukhara was the collapse of British authority in Afghanistan, a crisis that actually began 
before the Butenev mission’s return to Russia. On the morning of 2 November 1841, 
more than two and a half years after the Army of the Indus arrived in Kabul, Alexander 
Burnes and his brother, who was with him in Kabul, found their home surrounded by a 
throng of Afghans. Burnes’s servants warned him of rising tensions in the city, and even 
that there were reports of a plot to kill him.55 He initially hoped to calm the crowd simply 
by speaking to them, but it quickly became a mob too large and too angry to control. 
Burnes sent a messenger to the British cantonment secretly, to plead for troops, but they 
arrived too late to be of help. Burnes’s offers of money in exchange for his own safety 
and that of his brother were met with shouted demands that the two should come down 
from the balcony of his home into its garden. The few guards who were already there 
fired into the crowd. A stranger to the Residency, who had made his way to the balcony, 
finally convinced Burnes and his brother to accede to the mob’s demands, promising that 
once they were off the balcony he would make certain they reached safety. When they 
reached the ground floor, however, their escort shouted to the crowd. Both brothers were 
dead in a matter of moments.56 
Following Burnes’s death and the riots of that day, British power in Afghanistan 
slipped rapidly away. Macnaghten attempted to gain the support of neighboring chiefs, in 
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an effort to regain control of the situation.57 On 11 December 1841, Macnaghten rode out 
from Kabul to discuss a treaty with several Afghan chiefs.58 The treaty Macnaghten 
proposed declared that the British would retreat to India, either with or without Shah 
Shuja, according to his preference. Dost Muhammed would return to Afghanistan from 
India. The chiefs who heard the agreement accepted it, though they quickly followed 
their acceptance with proposals for changes to it (including the offer that Shah Shuja 
might remain king, provided that he permitted his daughters to marry the chiefs’ sons, 
and that he treated the chiefs themselves with greater respect going forward).59 The 
situation worsened for the British when Macnaghten attempted to negotiate 
independently with Akhbar Khan, who was one of the discontented chiefs and Dost 
Muhammad’s son. Akhbar Khan used one of their meetings to trap Macnaghten,60 killing 
him and one other British representative, and imprisoning two others.61 
The British left their camp at Kabul on 6 January 1842. Akhbar Khan and an 
“escort” joined them on their march the following day, claiming that their mission was to 
protect the British on their march toward Jalalabad. In reality, Akhbar Khan began his 
assistance by attempting to renegotiate the terms of the treaty signed on 11 December, 
and he eventually imprisoned several of the leading British officers. Only a few actually 
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reached Jalalabad; indeed, for a time the British thought only one man—Dr. William 
Brydon—had survived the disaster at Kabul. The rest died, either due to the extreme cold 
or because of the resistance the retreating British met from the Afghans, or were taken 
prisoner by Akhbar Khan.62 Akhbar Khan did protect his British prisoners, though their 
condition was far from luxurious.63 They were of value to him as negotiating leverage, 
but it also seems that he treated some of them, at least, with a care beyond that of mere 
political interest.64 
According to the prison journal Conolly kept during his final imprisonment, he 
and Stoddart learned of the British defeat in Afghanistan near the end of November of 
1841. When the emir first confronted them with the reports he had received from Kabul, 
Stoddart and Conolly were skeptical of their truth, and told the emir so. The emir 
(rightly) believed the reports, however, and the results soon showed in his treatment of 
his British prisoners. Convinced that Stoddart and Conolly “had been cut off from [their] 
support” when the British were expelled from Kabul, the emir began accusing Stoddart, 
Conolly, and the British government of conspiring against him with the rulers of 
Khoqand and Khiva.65 Eventually, he confined both officers to a single prison cell. Both 
men were plagued by illness, and Conolly’s journal contains a graphic description of the 
sores that covered Stoddart’s body and the pain they caused him. They were deprived of 
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their outer layers of clothing, despite the cold temperatures, and were not permitted to 
change what clothing they were allowed to keep for weeks and in fact months on end.66 
In late August of 1843, a detailed account of Stoddart and Conolly’s execution 
reached British papers, along with British envoy to Tehran Justin Sheil’s statement that 
he believed both the information and its source to be highly credible.67 Saaleh Mahomed, 
the source in question, had accompanied Conolly to Bukhara in late 1841, having served 
several other British agents in Central Asia before Conolly took him on.68 He was 
imprisoned when Stoddart and Conolly were, though separately from them. When several 
of Stoddart and Conolly’s servants were executed at the emir’s order, Saaleh Mahomed 
avoided joining them because he shared his captors’ Muslim faith.69 When the others 
were executed, he was released, and allowed to live wherever he was able in Bukhara.  
Meanwhile the emir’s treatment of Stoddart and Conolly worsened. Shortly after 
Saaleh Mahomed’s release, one of Nasrullah’s officers discovered that Stoddart had 
obtained paper and a pencil, though the emir had explicitly forbidden both British officers 
from writing anything unless the emir or one of his officials directed them to do so. 
Stoddart was beaten repeatedly over the following several days, but he refused to reveal 
to whom he had written or how he had obtained the materials. The emir therefore ordered 
that he be beheaded, and that Conolly be given his choice of conversion to Islam and 
execution. Although Saaleh Mahomed did not witness their executions himself, one of 
the executioners informed him that this is precisely what occurred, and that Conolly 
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chose execution rather than conversion. Saaleh Mahomed refused the executioner’s offer 
to show him the men’s heads, but he did see the freshly mounded graves where, 
according to the executioner, their bodies had been buried. Having assured himself that 
the officers were dead, Saaleh Mahomed left Bukhara, and after staying briefly in Khiva, 
proceeded to Tehran, where he told his story to Colonel Justin Sheil, the British 
ambassador there.70 
Within days of Saaleh Mahomed’s information appearing in the press, a member 
of the House of Commons asked Prime Minister if the government believed the report, 
and if so, what action might be taken against the emir in response. Peel gave a lengthy 
reply—this exchange constitutes by far the longest parliamentary discussion of Stoddart 
and Conolly—in which he recounted the various diplomatic attempts the government had 
already made to secure the officers’ release. He refused to discuss any actions the 
government might take now that their deaths seemed certain, but stated his belief that “in 
some way or other punishment would reach the Government” that executed them.71 This 
last phrase received several different interpretations in the press. According to the 
Reading Mercury, Peel intended to punish the emir for Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths,72 
while the Worcester Herald stated disapprovingly that he had expressed no such 
objective.73  
The articles describing Peel’s comments in the House of Commons did not 
suggest that he connected Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths with British policy in 
Afghanistan or elsewhere, nor did they make such a connection in their own analysis.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!70!!Morning Chronicle, 23 August 1843.!
71 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser. vol. 71, col (1010-1012). 
72 Reading Mercury, 26 August 1843. See also Chester Chronicle, 1 September 1843. 
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Instead, they placed the blame entirely on the Bukharan government. A competing 
understanding of the executions soon developed, however, which argued that Nasrullah 
merely acted as a logical analysis of British policy in Afghanistan required.74 The 
Newcastle Journal observed, in an article dated 21 January 1843, that Stoddart and 
Conolly were executed because “[t]he people of Central Asia have seen that the 
appearance of Englishmen at Cabool was followed up by the invasion of that 
territory…and they have chosen to profit by the lesson.”75  
Several weeks later, the London Evening Standard offered a more specific report 
on the role of Afghanistan in Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths. According to this version of 
events (many conflicting versions circulated in the months that followed), Nasrullah 
executed Stoddart and Conolly after receiving a letter from several Afghan chiefs, 
including Akhbar Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad who played such a key role in 
compelling the British to abandon Kabul. In this letter, the chiefs demanded that 
Nasrullah either execute Stoddart and Conolly himself or send them to Kabul. Forced to 
act (and presumably not wishing to have his independence from Britain doubted by those 
who had so recently overthrown British rule), Nasrullah ordered that Stoddart and 
Conolly be beheaded.76 
The retreat from Afghanistan received politically polarized reactions in the British 
press, as a failure of policies enacted by a Whig government. Because Stoddart and 
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Conolly came to be posthumously associated with the Afghan crisis, their deaths also 
took on a distinctly political flavor in some papers. The London Evening Standard, for 
example, described the “detestation” with which Central Asia regarded Britain as a result 
of her “momentary” losses in Afghanistan, under the influence of which the emir had 
executed Stoddart and Conolly.77 The Exeter and Plymouth Gazette reviled the “custom 
of sending daring individuals of some intelligence on nearly desperate political 
undertakings.” As victims of this “Whig misrule,” Stoddart and Conolly had been 
“sacrifice[d] to the Moloch of Whig foreign policy.”78  
While the Whigs received most of the blame for the officers’ deaths, Sir Robert 
Peel and the Conservatives were not entirely exempt. An article in the Evening Chronicle 
extended some of the responsibility for the tragedy to Peel by observing that Peel 
believed the Russian threat at Bukhara to be grave, and therefore could not reasonably 
argue that Stoddart and Conolly’s mission was purposeless.79 Such claims were to 
become particularly important as the debate regarding the government’s responsibility to 
Stoddart and Conolly heated. If their mission was in fact necessary, then, some argued, 
surely the government had a greater responsibility to ascertain their fates or attempt to 
secure their safety. 
Peel complicated the arguments for government responsibility by stating, in a 
Parliamentary debate in August of 1843, that Conolly was not actually in the 
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government’s service when he was arrested in Bukhara.80 A similar claim had been made 
about Stoddart, though by February of 1843 the London Evening Standard was rightly 
contesting this assertion.81 Peel was correct in that, as an officer of the Indian 
government, Conolly was not under the direction of the Foreign Office in London.82 
Nevertheless, he had received permission from India to travel to Bukhara in an official 
capacity, as the previous chapter noted. Inaccurate as Peel’s statement was, it seems to 
have temporarily called into question the degree of government responsibility for 
Stoddart and Conolly’s protection.  
Most papers seem to have concurred, then, that the policy of the British 
government in Afghanistan was at least partially responsible for the deaths of Stoddart 
and Conolly. This conviction contributed significantly to the sense that the government 
had a particularly strong obligation to attempt to secure their release either through 
military means, as Macnaghten proposed, or through diplomatic avenues. The 
government’s failure to take these steps was the more serious because both officers were 
commonly depicted as possessing excellent Christian characters and representing, on a 
personal level, key values of the British Empire. 
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Chapter Three: 
 A Quest for the Truth: Captain John Grover’s Campaign 
 
Even as Peel confirmed the reports of Stoddart and Conolly’s execution in the 
House of Commons, the press was publishing accounts suggesting that Saaleh 
Mahomed’s narrative might not be the end of Stoddart and Conolly’s story. The history 
of the officers’ stay at Bukhara had been littered with misinformation and conflicting 
reports almost from the beginning, with papers publishing claims that Stoddart had been 
released and was en route to Kabul as early as January of 1840.1 Saaleh Mahomed’s 
nearly eyewitness account of the double beheading did nothing to stamp out such rumors. 
On the same day it printed Peel’s remarks in the House of Commons, the Morning Post 
published another article stating that hajjis from Central Asia traveling through 
Constantinople on their way to Mecca believed both officers still to be alive. The article 
concluded, “[i]t is really time that the Government should take some steps to ascertain the 
truth of this matter, and in the event of its being certain that they have not been put to 
death, to adopt some immediate measures for their liberation.”2 
Captain John Grover, an army friend of Colonel Stoddart, took precisely this view 
of the Stoddart and Conolly affair. In light of the failure of both the press’ calls for 
government involvement and the inquiries of members of the House of Commons to 
prompt the government to action on Stoddart and Conolly’s behalf, Grover concluded 
that some other form of action would be necessary in order to convince the government !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Evening Mail, 10 January 1840. 
2 Morning Post, 26 August 1843. 
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to intervene. However, because he was unconvinced by the evidence pointing to Stoddart 
and Conolly’s execution, he believed that it was first necessary to determine just what 
had become of the officers. He launched multiple interconnected initiatives to discover 
the truth, beginning with a failed attempt to secure a government endorsement for his 
own expedition to Bukhara. Subsequent, more successful efforts to induce government 
intervention in the crisis included regular contact with the press; regular contact with the 
Foreign Office, and with Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen (1841-1846), specifically; the 
formation of a “Stoddart and Conolly Committee,” which hosted public meetings and 
funded Dr. Wolff’s journey to Bukhara; and the publication of a booklet of about fifty 
pages and a book of several hundred pages. This chapter will explore each of these 
attempts to involve the government in the crisis in turn, arguing that by orchestrating 
them, Grover provided a unified voice and a definite structure to the general outcry at 
Stoddart and Conolly’s fate that the movement had previously lacked.  
Grover founded his campaign for government action on Stoddart and Conolly’s 
behalf on the conviction that the true fate of the officers remained a mystery. The doubt 
Grover entertained about Stoddart and Conolly’s fate ran contrary to the government’s 
official position, as supported by evidence from the British ambassador in Tehran.3 Until 
the summer of 1843, the press, too, seemed full of information that opposed Grover’s 
view. In the months following the first reports of the executions, newspapers across Great 
Britain continued to confirm the initial report of the executions and to report additional 
details throughout the winter and spring months of 1843, drawing from sources in 
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Constantinople, Tehran, and Delhi.4 Sir Robert Peel confirmed the report in Parliament 
that February,5 and in March the official military obituaries, published in some papers, 
listed Colonel Stoddart (though not Captain Conolly) among the deceased.6  
Grover began to publically question Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths after reading a 
newspaper report that suggested that the government had pronounced Stoddart and 
Conolly dead too hastily, and that the officers were in fact still alive in the emir’s prison.7 
The earliest articles stated that this new rumor emerged in Mashhad (modern Iran) among 
the Jewish community there,8 although it was later reported to have reached Ludhiana, in 
Punjab, as well.9 In England, newspaper editors printed these reports with caution, 
warning readers against placing complete trust in either version of the events. As one 
article in the Hertford Mercury and Reformer observed, “[b]oth countries are so far 
removed from British influence as to make all intercourse difficult and dangerous, and to 
render all intelligence doubtful and uncertain.”10  
Distance notwithstanding, Grover found these reports far more credible than the 
earlier evidence that the officers were dead. As he later explained to Aberdeen’s secretary 
in the Foreign Office, he doubted the credibility of Stoddart and Conolly’s fellow 
prisoner in Bukhara, Saaleh Mahomed, who was the source of the report that Stoddart 
and Conolly had been killed (although Colonel Sheil, then envoy in Tehran, had 
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identified him as a reliable individual). Furthermore, Grover argued, even if Saaleh 
Mahomed was truthfully reporting the information he had received, the fact remained that 
he had not witnessed the execution himself, nor had he seen any definitive evidence of it. 
He had failed to confirm the testimony of the guard who told him of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s deaths, and Grover therefore deemed him doubly unreliable.11 
 Concluding that the British government “had really no precise information on the 
subject” of Stoddart and Conolly’s fate in Bukhara, Grover began preparing to travel to 
Bukhara himself to learn what had actually taken place.12 In late June of 1843, he visited 
the Foreign Office seeking approval for the journey, which he intended to make entirely 
at his own expense. He was only willing to do so, however, if the British government 
would allow him to go in uniform as an officer of the British army. For Grover, this was a 
question of safety: unless able to clearly identify himself as a traveller authorized by the 
British government, he feared he would be mistaken for a spy.13 Despite the contradictory 
news reports, the Foreign Office saw no reason to disbelieve the initial report that 
Stoddart and Conolly had been executed, and as a result, would not sanction Grover’s 
proposed mission. Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary would permit him to undertake the 
journey if he would forego the protection of a British officer’s uniform.14 Grover refused 
this offer angrily, writing later that a private citizen would only survive the journey from 
England to Bukhara by pretending to be insane.15 This comment accompanied a scathing 
account of his interactions with the junior officials with whom he dealt during his visit to 
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the Foreign Office and of Lord Aberdeen, who initially refused to meet with him 
personally.16 
 Lord Aberdeen did eventually meet with Grover, and the two corresponded 
extensively between the time Grover became involved in the Stoddart and Conolly affair 
and Wolff’s return from his journey to Bukhara. Thus Aberdeen played a significant, if 
somewhat unwilling, role in Grover’s campaign. He had not occupied the position of 
foreign secretary in 1838, when Stoddart had received his orders to travel to Bukhara, 
however. The Whig government led by Lord Melbourne, with Lord Palmerston in charge 
of the Foreign Office, had been replaced in 1841 with a conservative government led by 
Sir Robert Peel. As Peel’s Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen pursued a foreign policy very 
different from that of Palmerston, part of which involved terminating British interference 
in Afghan politics, much to Peel’s satisfaction.17 Despite widespread fear of Russian 
intentions toward British India, the Foreign Office largely cooperated with Russia under 
Aberdeen’s leadership. The largest foreign policy question the two nations shared during 
this period involved not Central Asia or India but the fragility of the Ottoman Empire.18 
On this question, at least, Russian and British interests intersected; both nations 
benefitted from a stable, if weak, Ottoman Empire.19 As a result, Aberdeen largely 
accommodated Russian interests regarding both the Ottoman Empire and other issues, 
though he remained cautious in his handling of Anglo-Russian relations.20 Nevertheless, 
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Aberdeen accepted the expansion of Russian trade in Central Asia without threat of 
retaliation, provided Russia never directly menaced British interests in the region.21  
 Aberdeen initially took little action regarding Stoddart and Conolly’s 
imprisonment, following a precedent set by Palmerston before him. Stoddart had sent a 
spate of letters to Palmerston and Macnaghten throughout the first half of 1841, reporting 
that the emir was interested in concluding a treaty with Britain, and asking both for 
official approval of a treaty and for a variety of gifts for the emir.22 Foreign Office 
records show that Palmerston requested the cooperation of the London Horticultural 
Society in obtaining one of the gifts—a box of seeds from English plants—and that 
Palmerston himself replied to several of Stoddart’s letters at once in early August.23 Little 
else seems to have been done under Palmerston’s watch, and Stoddart and Conolly faded 
still further from view during the first years of Aberdeen’s secretaryship. Although 
Nasrullah had written to Queen Victoria in March of 1841 seeking to establish a 
“covenant of friendship,” Victoria’s reply was drafted only in December of 1842.24 By 
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the time the letter had been completed, however, news of Stoddart and Conolly’s 
execution had already spread, and therefore it was never sent.25  
 In spite of the Foreign Office’s lackluster response to communications from 
Bukhara, Aberdeen hoped to persuade Grover that his proposed expedition was 
unnecessary by demonstrating that the Foreign Office had already attempted every 
possible means of helping Stoddart and Conolly. He therefore invited Grover to examine 
the Foreign Office’s records on the subject. Grover was appalled by the lack of effort 
these records seemed to show, viewing them simply as more concrete evidence of the 
government’s lack of concern for Stoddart and Conolly.26  
Even worse than the impact of the actions not taken, Grover argued, was the 
potential impact of those that had been taken. He was particularly outraged by a letter 
addressed to the emir of Bukhara from Lord Ellenborough. In this letter, Ellenborough 
refuted the emir’s charge that the British had sent Stoddart and Conolly to conspire 
against him, describing Stoddart and Conolly as “innocent travellers…not employed by 
their government in such designs.”27 Reading this letter in front of a Foreign Office 
employee, Grover accused the Foreign Office of making matters worse for the officers. 
Nasrullah, he argued, would understand the term innocent traveller to mean that Stoddart 
and Conolly were not actually employed by the British government at all. The men had 
claimed from the beginning that they were agents of their government; the emir, already 
skeptical of their authenticity, would understand this letter to mean that the British 
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government disowned Stoddart and Conolly as her representatives, making them out to 
be liars.28 
 Unwilling to accept Aberdeen’s terms for his proposed mission to Bukhara and 
further convinced of the government’s disinterest in his friend’s plight, Grover was 
compelled to find another means of discovering the truth behind the rumors regarding 
Stoddart and Conolly’s fate. It was at this point that he met the Reverend Dr. Joseph 
Wolff, who had visited Bukhara in the early 1830s as a missionary to the city’s Jewish 
population. Wolff agreed to travel to Bukhara on Grover’s behalf, and was willing to do 
so without any official government sanction, trusting that his status as a clergyman and 
his previous trip to Bukhara would protect him. He asked only that someone travel with 
him, or else offer to fund his journey, which he calculated would cost a total of £500.29  
Grover seized this opportunity to obtain support for his friend and for Captain Conolly, 
and immediately took on the role of Wolff’s publicist and first financier.  
Rather than undertaking the entire task alone, Grover called a public meeting for 7 
September 1843 at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in order to raise some of the necessary 
funds.30 This choice of location is noteworthy. Beginning in the eighteenth century, 
taverns increasingly catered to patrons of varying social status by offering private rooms 
for the use of societies and organizations,31 and it seems likely that Grover took 
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advantage of such a space. However, the nineteenth century saw a decline in the social 
respectability of tavern drinking,32 and it is worth noting that this initial meeting about 
Wolff’s expedition seems to be the only event open to the general public to have occurred 
in a tavern. Grover’s choice of venue certainly would have limited the type of individual 
who attended the event. Subsequent events related to Grover’s campaign were held in 
more reputable spaces that were often used for lectures and concerts, the implications of 
which I will explore in my next chapter.33 
In spite of the limitations of the venue he chose, Grover apparently regarded this 
first meeting as a success. According to a report from the Morning Herald that Grover 
later published in The Bokhara Victims, his book-length work on the Stoddart and 
Conolly affair, between eighty and one hundred men attended this meeting, among them 
names the author expected his reader to recognize.34 One of the attendees, a Mr. J.S. 
Buckingham, suggested that a committee be formed to support Wolff’s mission.35 His 
motion was carried, and Buckingham himself eventually became a member of the 
resulting committee.36 Although at least one attendee later wrote to a newspaper to say 
that he found Grover passionate but ultimately unpersuasive, Grover’s cause seems to 
have enjoyed the general support of his audience.37 At the conclusion of the meeting, 
when he requested subscriptions to fund Wolff’s expedition, he received around £100.38 
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As the date of Wolff’s departure approached, the Stoddart and Conolly 
Committee, as it was officially called, hosted another public meeting to publicize its 
activities, this time in the opulent Hanover Square Rooms.39 Both Grover and Wolff 
spoke at length at this meeting, and detailed accounts of their comments appeared in 
multiple London papers the following day.40 The article in the Morning Chronicle 
described the attendance at this meeting as disappointing.41 Nevertheless, the 
Committee’s subsequent efforts to raise funds for Wolff were successful. According to a 
pamphlet published by the committee, a copy of which Grover sent to Aberdeen in the 
Foreign Office, the committee had succeeded in raising nearly £800 by January of 
1844.42 
The press proved extremely willing to publicize the activities of the Stoddart and 
Conolly Committee, and as president of that committee Grover ensured that the London 
newspapers received full information on both the committee’s activities and on the 
progress of Wolff’s journey to Bukhara. Once Wolff departed for Bukhara, he supplied 
Grover with a steady stream of letters describing his progress, the individuals he met as 
he travelled, and the rumors about Stoddart and Conolly’s fate he was able to collect in 
each new city. Grover then submitted these letters, or extracts and paraphrases of them, to 
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London papers, from which they spread to other parts of Britain.43 This practice kept the 
Stoddart and Conolly affair consistently before the public, allowing Grover to maintain 
popular interest in his cause. 
As the principle liaison between the Stoddart and Conolly Committee and the 
general public, Grover benefitted greatly from the steadily increasing role of the press in 
the lives of a growing number of British citizens. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, 
interest in political affairs increased dramatically among the middle and lower classes, a 
reality which was reflected in the newspapers of the day.44 The papers in circulation 
represented a wide array of political views, and often exerted pressure on the government 
or on government policy, sometimes successfully.45 In some cases, editors were not 
afraid to call on readers to demonstrate publically to demand changes in government 
policy.46 The topics that received the greatest publicity in the early 1840s were either 
domestic (the Chartrist movement, or the controversy over the Corn Laws) or of more 
dramatic international scope than the Stoddart and Conolly crisis (the First Anglo-Afghan 
War, for example).47 The imprisonment of two officers in a kingdom well removed from 
even the most distant reaches of the empire was not a matter to generate daily front-page 
headlines. As a result, government officials were likely to be far more concerned about 
those issues that obtained the greatest coverage in the press. Nevertheless, Grover’s 
reports on the activities of the Stoddart and Conolly committee and the progress of 
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Wolff’s journey to and from Bukhara received wide attention, appearing in London and 
regional papers alike.  
The papers, then, were willing to publish Grover’s articles, but who read them? 
Grover’s efforts must have benefitted at least moderately from an 1836 reduction in the 
tax on newspapers. These stamp duties had been raised in 1815, resulting in the failure of 
papers which received neither government nor opposition support. The 1836 reduction 
represented only a partial solution to the problem (the stamp duties were eliminated 
completely in 1855), but it did allow editors to reduce the cost of their papers slightly.48 
The average working man was still unable to afford a newspaper, in most cases—but as 
Grover’s primary intention, particularly in the early days of the Stoddart and Conolly 
Committee, was to raise funds to finance Wolff’s expedition, it is doubtful that he 
worried over his failure to reach the poorer classes.49  
Still, access to the printed news was not wholly determined by one’s ability to 
afford an evening paper in early Victorian Britain. For those who could not afford, or 
chose not to purchase, their own newspapers, there were reading rooms and coffee shops 
that provided a selection of papers for patrons to read. Coffee houses were well-
established phenomena in England by the beginning of the 18th century,50 and proliferated 
in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Approximately a dozen operated in London 
immediately after the end of the Napoleonic Wars; by the early 1840s (and the height of 
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the Stoddart-Conolly affair), there were 1600 or more in London alone.51 Many of these 
establishments offered very inexpensive coffee—far cheaper than a daily paper, even 
after the 1836 tax decrease—and the opportunity for any customer to read any newspaper 
available. One such establishment reportedly served between 1600 and 1800 customers 
daily, a success which the owner credited partially to the availability of newspapers at his 
establishment.52  
Thus Grover’s careful cultivation of the press’ interest in Colonel Stoddart and 
Captain Conolly would have brought their fate to the attention of a significant population 
of newspaper readers. However, Grover was not the only contributor of articles relating 
to Bukhara and the British officers there. Reports that emerged in other parts of the 
empire gradually made their way back to Britain, and were duly reprinted in newspapers 
there. In November of 1843, for example, the London Evening Standard published a 
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report which it credited to the Bombay Gentleman’s Gazette, stating that Stoddart (though 
not Conolly) was alive and well, though apparently still in Bukhara.53 
Often, when Grover prepared Wolff’s letters for publication in the newspapers, he 
submitted an additional copy of the same material to the Foreign Office, so that Aberdeen 
would be aware of the committee’s activities. The Foreign Office’s involvement in 
determining Stoddart and Conolly’s circumstances in Bukhara was never sufficient to 
satisfy Grover or the Stoddart and Conolly Committee. When the Stoddart and Conolly 
Committee was formed, its members agreed to invite the Foreign Office to support their 
intention of sending Wolff to Bukhara. In keeping with this objective, Grover 
consistently reported to Aberdeen the content of Wolff’s letters (which he then sent to the 
papers for publication). Aberdeen, or more frequently his secretary, Henry Unwin 
Addington, acknowledged these letters, but only occasionally initiated contact with 
Grover. When he did so, it was often in order to invite him to read a dispatch recently 
received from British officials in Persia that pertained to Stoddart and Conolly’s case, and 
therefore would be of interest to Grover.54 A review of this correspondence strongly 
suggests that the efforts of the Stoddart and Conolly Committee compelled the Foreign 
Office to address the fate of its officers in Bukhara more frequently than it had prior to 
the committee’s formation. However, more frequent communication about Stoddart and 
Conolly does not seem to have produced a change in the government’s handling of 
Stoddart and Conolly’s case; official records offer no indication that the government 
made additional efforts to secure more accurate information about their fate. 
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Grover’s persistent correspondence with Aberdeen may have affected the East 
India Company’s understanding of the importance of the Stoddart and Conolly crisis. A 
volume of confidential papers now archived in the India Office Records at the British 
Library includes some 128 pages of correspondence, largely culled from Foreign Office 
records, relating to Stoddart and Conolly’s captivity.55 However, the earliest of these 
documents dates to 1844. Thus, government officials who consulted only this volume 
would have had no information about Stoddart and Conolly from the period before Wolff 
set off for Bukhara. Stoddart’s numerous letters to the Foreign Office, written in the first 
half of 1841, and Emir Nasrullah’s letter to Queen Victoria are all absent from this 
collection. Because Grover’s campaign represented the single largest change in the nature 
of the Stoddart and Conolly affair, the apparently sudden interest in it reflected in the 
India Office Records as of 1844 may indicate that Grover’s campaign had prompted the 
East India Company to pay greater attention to Stoddart and Conolly’s situation. 
While Grover corresponded privately with the Foreign Office with the hope that 
the information he provided would induce it to act definitively on Stoddart and Conolly’s 
behalf, he communicated with the press in order to create public support for his campaign 
and public outrage over Stoddart and Conolly’s fate. The two forms of correspondence 
seem neatly compartmentalized: the newspapers brought public attention and financial 
gifts to the cause, while regular contact with government officials (ideally, at any rate) 
brought government support. Somewhat ironically, it is among the government 
documents that we find the most concrete evidence of the efficacy of Grover’s public 
efforts. As I have previously noted, Grover sent Aberdeen a copy of the committee’s 
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report in January of 1844, which included a list of those who had subscribed funds to the 
cause.56 Many of the subscriptions are small—some under a pound57—but the number of 
subscribers indicates the effectiveness of the Committee’s public appeal, despite its 
ambiguous impact on the British government. 
In forming the Stoddart and Conolly Committee, publishing Wolff’s letters in the 
press, and communicating with Aberdeen, Grover focused primarily on learning the truth 
about the officers’ fate in Bukhara, rather than on assigning blame or responsibility for 
whatever that fate might have been. However, in the two publications he authored about 
the crisis, Grover stated explicitly where he believed the fault lay in Stoddart and 
Conolly’s deaths. The first of these publications, a pamphlet entitled An Appeal to the 
British Nation, appeared in late summer of 1843. Grover intended it primarily as a source 
of publicity for his campaign, as he believed that Stoddart and Conolly’s fate had 
attracted insufficient attention in Britain. In it, he accused the government of doing too 
little to assist its agents abroad, and of not realizing the potential implications of 
Ellenborough’s description of Stoddart and Conolly as “innocent travellers.”58 A review 
of this work in The Examiner expressed surprise at Grover’s contention that Stoddart and 
Conolly were still alive, but ultimately found his argument persuasive.59 
The second publication, The Bokhara Victims, Grover’s full-length book about his 
campaign, was published after Wolff’s return from Bukhara with confirmation from the 
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emir himself that Stoddart and Conolly were dead.60 From its first pages, this book 
reveals Grover’s conviction that the British government’s failures lay at the heart of the 
officers’ execution. In the dedication to Queen Victoria, Grover wrote, 
My objective in presuming to dedicate the following to your Majesty, is the 
hope of directing your majesty’s attention to the cruel sufferings and alleged 
murder of two British officers, who were sent on an important diplomatic mission, 
on your Majesty’s service, and who appear to have been abandoned in an 
unaccountable manner, by your Majesty’s government. 
I consider it my duty to state to your Majesty, that the circumstances attending 
this extraordinary case are degrading to the British nation, and are of a nature to 
dim the lustre of your Majesty’s crown.61 
 
The sense of national shame stemming from Stoddart and Conolly’s abandonment recurs 
in Grover’s work. A French general whom Grover met in Algiers in 1840 suggested that 
perhaps Stoddart and Conolly had been intentionally abandoned by the British 
government;62 the Russian authorities he consulted later in his campaign concurred.63 To 
Grover, who believed that the British soldier’s ability to trust his commanding officer 
implicitly was the source of British military success, such accusations were humiliating.64 
In contrast to the deplorable behavior of the British government, Grover argued, the 
Bukharan emir was relatively magnanimous to Stoddart and Conolly. According to 
Grover, Nasrullah waited nearly four years, in Stoddart’s case, to receive official 
confirmation from the British government that the officers were in fact verified agents of 
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the British government, and even set up post offices to facilitate communication between 
Bukhara and Britain.65 
 The Bokhara Victims was favorably reviewed in a number of publications. 
Grover’s descriptions of governmental nonchalance of Stoddart and Conolly’s fate 
disturbed reviewers, leading to renewed condemnations of the government’s handling of 
the crisis and calls for greater government involvement in similar situations going 
forward. One reviewer accused the government of “play[ing] an Iscariot part,”66 while 
another inquired, “Will the government of a great nation like England suffer its honor to 
be thus bearded and trampled upon with impunity—its power to be treated with mockery 
and contempt—and the traditions of its glory to be buried under the scorn of a barbarian 
sovereign…?”67 There was no hesitation to join Grover in laying the blame for the crisis 
entirely at the government’s feet; in fact, two articles recommended alternate titles for 
The Bokhara Victims that more clearly indicated the government’s role in the crisis. One 
review therefore bore the title “The Victims of Diplomacy,” while another, even more 
directly, suggested that the book would have been more aptly titled “Victims of Downing 
Street.”68 The authors of these articles also praised Grover for his commitment to 
discovering the truth, and for bringing the government’s failures to light.69 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Grover, The Bokhara Victims, 234f. 
66 Morning Post, 22 April 1845. 
67 “The Bokhara Victims,” New Monthly Magazine and Humorist 74: 293 (May 1845), 
130, accessed 21 January 2016, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/4415567?accountid=15131. 
68 “The Victims of Diplomacy,” Ainsworth’s Magazine 7 (January 1845), 396-400, 
accessed 21 January 2016, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/4309611?accountid=15131; Morning Post, 22 April 
1845. 
69 See for example “The Victims of Diplomacy,” 400. 
! 72 
 Not all looked on Grover’s efforts so favorably, however. A review in a London 
literary periodical accused him of adopting an unsuitably bombastic tone, which led 
reviewers to question the trustworthiness of his judgment.70 The Edinburgh Review, 
which published a staggering nearly forty-page rebuttal of Grover’s work, also attacked 
Grover personally in its analysis of his book. Although genuinely interested in Stoddart 
and Conolly’s well-being, the Review argued, Grover treated government officials with 
insufficient respect and allowed his self-importance to color his narration of the crisis.71 
(In the Review’s words, Grover was “not a man to hide his light under a bushel.”)72 More 
significantly, however, the Review argued that Grover had grossly misrepresented the 
facts of the government’s treatment of Stoddart and Conolly. Noting the Queen’s letter to 
Nasrullah, which Grover omitted in his account, and several other omissions and cases of 
faulty logic, the article accused Grover of being determined to believe that the 
government had treated Stoddart and Conolly badly regardless of the facts of the case.73 
 Despite the Review’s negative response to Grover’s book (and to Grover 
personally) it seems clear that the campaign Grover initiated significantly transformed the 
way the Stoddart and Conolly crisis was presented to the public. His persistent use of the 
press, his two publications, and the committee he formed all placed Stoddart and 
Conolly’s fate before the public far more regularly than had been possible when publicity 
was dependent solely on the receipt of some new piece of intelligence from Tehran. 
Grover had not rejected the themes in earlier press coverage of the Stoddart and Conolly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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affair; compelling the government to take up its proper role in resolving the crisis was 
central to his campaign. Grover’s campaign was somewhat limited in its appeal, however, 
as his tavern committee meeting hinted. His partnership with the missionary and traveller 
Joseph Wolff provided the additional interest—and indeed drama—Grover’s movement 
needed to reach a larger audience. Wolff’s contribution will be the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Four: 
 Dr. Joseph Wolff: Writer, Ethnographer, Missionary 
 
Born in Bavaria in 1796 to Jewish parents (his father was a rabbi),1 Joseph Wolff 
converted to Catholicism at the age of twelve. He later travelled to Rome, where he 
enrolled in a missionary training college. While a student there, he was introduced to the 
pope, who called Wolff his “son” and offered Wolff the opportunity to hear lectures in 
the pope’s own seminary. Struck by his kindness, Wolff patted him on the shoulder and 
requested his blessing.2 His presumption caused an uproar in his college, and when in the 
ensuing debates it emerged that, although Wolff respected the pope, he did not believe in 
his infallibility, Wolff was expelled from the college.3 Increasingly disillusioned with 
Catholicism and with nothing to keep him in Rome, Wolff accepted an invitation from 
the evangelical banker Henry Drummond to continue his missionary training in England, 
where he eventually became an Anglican clergyman.4  
Because of his unusual background, Wolff seems at first glance an unlikely 
candidate for a mission to rescue two servants of the British Empire in Central Asia. In 
fact, however, he was uniquely well-suited to the mission to Bukhara. In the 1820s and 
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1830s, Wolff travelled widely as a missionary to Jews and Muslims in Turkey, the 
Caucuses, Palestine, Persia, Central Asia, and India.5 Wolff’s second missionary tour, 
which occurred in the early 1830s, included a visit to Kanpur, in India, where Wolff met 
Arthur Conolly, of whom he formed an extremely favorable opinion.6 Wolff also 
travelled to Bukhara during the same missionary tour. He had two objectives there: to 
convert the city’s Jewish population to Christianity, and to attempt to discover a 
connection between the Bukharan Jews and the Biblical Lost Tribes of Israel, of whom 
he believed the Bukharan Jews to be descendants.7  
Having travelled to Bukhara, and knowing Captain Conolly personally, Wolff was 
perfectly positioned to travel to Bukhara once more, this time on the behalf of Grover’s 
Stoddart and Conolly Committee to determine the truth of the conflicting reports about 
the officers’ fates. Wolff’s contribution to Grover’s mission was twofold: the drama of 
his journey to Bukhara and his frequent letters about it provided Grover with material to 
supply to the press as the Foreign Office, thereby keeping Stoddart and Conolly in the 
public eye, while Wolff’s identity as an amateur ethnographer and an experienced 
Christian missionary attracted a broader audience than Grover’s strictly political message 
could have drawn.  
 Wolff first offered publically to travel to Bukhara in a letter dated 2 July 1843, 
which appeared first in the Morning Herald and after circulated in other papers as well. 
The letter took the form of a plea addressed to British Army officers, one or more of 
whom Wolff hoped to inspire either to join him for the journey to Bukhara, or else to pay !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Wolff’s expenses if he undertook the trip alone.8 This initial appeal was unconnected 
with Grover’s campaign, but Grover contacted Wolff immediately after it appeared, and 
the two men worked closely together from that point forward.  
Wolff, like Grover, distrusted the reports of Stoddart and Conolly’s execution 
circulating in the press in mid-1843, particularly the comparatively detailed account of 
Saaleh Mahomed, which British ambassador to Tehran Justin Sheil had endorsed. As he 
explained in a letter to Grover, parts of which Grover submitted to the London papers for 
publication, Wolff found it improbable that Saaleh Mahomed would have heard of the 
execution only from one of the executioners, as other Bukharan executions of which 
Wolff was aware had been public events.9 The method of execution seemed even more 
unlikely, as Wolff had understood that Bukharan executions generally relied on poisons 
or strangulation (though he later learned that Nasrullah had indeed instituted a policy of 
replacing strangulation with beheading).10  
Thus, Wolff’s mission to Bukhara, like Grover’s campaign in Britain, focused 
more on discovering the truth about Stoddart and Conolly’s fate than on allocating the 
blame for it. He wrote frequent letters to Grover on his journey toward Bukhara, 
describing his progress and making careful note of the rumors about Stoddart and 
Conolly circulating at each of his stops. Although he became increasingly pessimistic 
about his chances of finding the officers alive, he refrained from declaring absolutely that 
they were dead until he reached Bukhara itself.11 It was only after his return to England, 
when he published his account of the mission to Bukhara in book form, that he addressed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the extent to which he believed the government to be responsible for Stoddart and 
Conolly’s deaths.12 
The letters Wolff sent to Grover were not merely the raw material of his published 
narrative, awaiting elaboration and commentary, though they did serve that purpose. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, these letters also gave Grover new material with which 
to maintain public interest in his campaign through the press, and to repeatedly draw the 
attention of the Foreign Office to Stoddart and Conolly’s fate. The content and tone of 
Wolff’s correspondence lent itself particularly well to this task. Wolff had a flair for the 
dramatic that was evident even on the page, and the excerpts and paraphrases of these 
letters that Grover published in the press included sensational stories and predictions 
about the mission’s future as well as reports of Wolff’s progress and the rumors he 
gathered about Stoddart and Conolly. Such dramatic tales played an even more 
significant role in Wolff’s book on the mission. 
The use of these anecdotes as a means of capturing public interest developed out 
of a larger movement within nineteenth century orientalist discourse. In his history of 
orientalism, Said describes the orientalism of the early nineteenth century as a 
predominantly scholastic phenomenon that produced numerous scholarly publications 
and academic societies.13 In the writings of early Victorian travellers to the Levant, 
however, Alessandro Olsaretti found that many travelogue writers favored depictions of 
“picturesque” or “carnivalesque” scenes to more traditionally erudite content.14 Despite 
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the relevance of some of Wolff’s content to the field of ethnology, his narrative is more a 
specimen of picturesque language used to create a sense of distance between subject and 
object, than a work of intellectual orientalism.15  
Wolff imbued his letters to Grover with the sense that he and his mission were 
constantly threatened. Several days before his arrival in Bukhara, Wolff wrote a letter to 
the Stoddart and Conolly Committee, which he concluded by saying, “In six days it will 
be decided whether Stoddart and Conolly are alive, or whether I shall be allowed to leave 
the town [of Bukhara] again. In six days I shall enter Bokhara.”16 In a similar letter, 
written slightly earlier in the journey and addressed to a group of European societies 
advocating social reform, Wolff stated that he feared he might not return from Bukhara, 
and urged his readers to use his death as motivation for eradicating slavery completely in 
Bukhara. The emotional appeal of this self-sacrifice was augmented by the paragraph that 
followed, which urged his wife’s family to take pity on his widow and son if he were 
killed in Bukhara.17 Wolff’s use of dramatic language and his frequent sense of 
foreboding that the mission might spiral out of his control emphasized the narrative’s 
essentially nonacademic (though still unquestionably orientalist) nature, and capitalized 
on what Olsaretti terms the “vulgar curiosity” of nineteenth-century Britain about the 
East.18 
Wolff’s Narrative of a Mission expressed many of the same fears his letters 
voiced, though with the addition of more stories that emphasizing the cultural distance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between Britain and Bukhara and the risk Wolff undertook in travelling there. Describing 
the death of one of Conolly’s servants, Youssuf (Joseph), Wolff mused, “I could [n]ot 
help thinking that there was another poor Youssuf who might shortly share the fate of his 
more dignified predecessor. Strangling, I learnt also, was abandoned by the present 
King—that was one comfort, for I have a strong antipathy to hanging—and slaughtering 
with a knife substituted in its room.”19 Wolff rendered the cultural differences between 
Bukhara and Britain particularly striking in his subsequent description of his arrival in 
Bukhara. Thousands of people representing many of Bukhara’s numerous ethnicities 
gathered to witness his entry into the city, he wrote. People congregated even on the roofs 
of houses to watch his party enter the city; among those who remained in the city streets 
were some of the city’s mullahs, who spoke respectfully to him, and women in veils, who 
shouted that an English ambassador had arrived.20  
Both the dramatic stories and Wolff’s sense of foreboding are manifestations of 
the powerful nonacademic curiosity about the East that Olsaretti identifies as common in 
mid-nineteenth century travelogues. Still, there was sufficient paranoia in Wolff’s 
predictions to render some of his contemporaries suspicious of his reliability as a source 
of information. In January 1845, the Evening Mail suggested not once but twice that 
Wolff had misrepresented his stay in Bukhara, and that the emir would have allowed him 
to leave whenever he chose to do so.21 The London Evening Standard repudiated this 
story the following month as an attempt to “weaken the sympathy every Englishman 
must feel for this noble-minded man” (though the Standard does not state why this would 
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be desirable).22 It is true that Wolff seems largely unable to assess accurately the 
motivations of the Central Asians with whom he interacted, and his characterizations of 
individuals are therefore best treated with some skepticism. However, there seems little 
reason to doubt that the events of Wolff’s journey to and from Bukhara occurred 
essentially as he described them, even if he indulged in occasional embellishments.  
In any case, Wolff’s skeptics seem to have been a minority, based on the 
reception of Narrative of a Mission when it appeared in print in mid-1845. Wolff 
published the volume by subscription, meaning that future purchasers advanced money to 
cover publication costs. According to the London Evening Standard, Wolff’s subscribers 
included former Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston and Prince Albert himself, which 
constituted a quiet endorsement of some part of Wolff’s mission at least, though not 
necessarily of Grover’s vitriolic political rhetoric.23 The many reviews of Wolff’s book 
were largely favorable, but they frequently avoided the political implications of his 
mission, a topic that (as I have discussed previously) had already become heated earlier 
the same year with the publication of Grover’s monograph about his campaign.24  
Instead of reevaluating the government’s role in the Stoddart and Conolly affair 
based on the new evidence Wolff provided, reviewers mined the work for ethnographic 
insights into the populations Wolff encountered during his travels. They found a 
considerable amount of it to discuss; although Wolff provided ample material to satisfy 
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what Olsaretti termed the “vulgar curiosity” of nonacademic Victorian orientalism, he 
also recorded many observations typical of the more scholarly orientalist study of 
ethnology. Thus Chamber’s Edinburgh Journal observed that “[w]hatever may be 
thought of the policy of Dr Wolff’s mission to Bokhara, or of Captain Grover’s motives 
in promoting the inquiry,” the information Wolff gathered during travels provided fresh 
insight into the “savage state” of Bukhara, for which British readers would be grateful.25 
  Wolff’s monograph in fact contained many instances of the ethnological 
observations Chamber’s Edinburgh Journal noted. These types of descriptions of 
individuals and cultures developed out of a particular manifestation of British orientalism 
which had gained wide currency by beginning of his journey to Bukhara: the fields of 
physical anthropology and ethnology. The field of physical anthropology, established by 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, and became closely intertwined with the field of ethnology through the 
writings of European travelers.26 In England, this school of classification, which 
ultimately valued the western European model of culture and progress above any other 
possibility, was led by James Cowles Prichard. In his research, which culminated in the 
five-volume magnum opus entitled Researches into the Physical History of Man, he 
sought to establish the degree of relationship between human populations.27 The 
completed work accounted for even relatively unknown ethnicities, including the Uzbeks 
of Bukhara, in a global chain of relations based largely on linguistic data. Prichard did !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not espouse these theories alone; by the late 1840s and early 1850s there were several 
other major scholars (Charles Hamilton Smith, Robert Latham, and Robert Knox, to 
name only a few) conducting similar research.28 
 Wolff’s travel narrative was intertwined with the development of ethnology in 
Victorian Britain in two ways. First, Prichard, though the leading ethnologist of his 
generation, was an armchair ethnologist, basing his research largely on information 
culled from earlier publications. Thus he was largely dependent on the writings of those 
who had travelled, as Wolff did, to the areas about which he wrote. In his discussion of 
Bukhara and the Uzbeks, Prichard references the writings of Alexander Burnes and John 
Wood, and cites two German travellers, Zwick and Schill, in his description of the 
Turkmen inhabitants of the region.29 These works included observations on the physical 
appearance (including skull shape) and character of the populations they described—
precisely the type of information on which Prichard founded his research. 
Secondly, Prichard and the travel writers whose insights he borrowed shared 
common orientalist views of the cultures and peoples they described. Racism in the 
modern sense of the word, as the idea of categorizing populations based on shared 
ancestry and common heritable traits, did not emerge until the 1850s and 1860s.30 Yet all 
of these writers were united in a sense of superiority to and separation from their Central 
Asian subjects. Wolff’s descriptions of the Central Asians he met frequently accord well 
with the more general characterizations entire populations that Prichard provides. 
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Prichard (quoting Wood and Burnes) described the Uzbeks as “brave and intelligent, but 
cruel and rapacious.”31
 
Wolff would offer more individualized characterizations based on 
his own experience, of course, but he would hardly have disagreed with “cruel” and 
“rapacious” as descriptors of the Bukharan elite.32  
Wolff’s prejudices are particularly prominent in his descriptions of the individuals 
he met in Bukhara. The emir of Bukhara was a despot, to summarize Wolff’s analysis, 
and the nayeb, Abdul Samut Khan, was a conniving, greedy, lying murderer.33 Prior to 
Wolff’s arrival in Bukhara, the nayeb’s identity was a source of confusion. Sir Stratford 
Canning sent information to the Foreign Office in February of 1844, indicating that 
Stoddart himself had adopted the name Abdul Samut Khan, having become a Muslim and 
been appointed Chief of Artillery by the emir of Bukhara.34 In a report dated several days 
after these. Wolff described Abdul Samut Khan as Stoddart’s host in Bukhara.35 Wolff’s 
identification of Abdul Samut Khan’s identity was the correct one, as he found when he 
arrived in the city, but his role in Stoddart and Conolly’s history was far less clear. In the 
first full account of Stoddart and Conolly’s execution to appear in the British press, Wolff 
identifies Abdul Samut Khan as a “sincere and excellent friend of the British nation.”36 
The nayeb had wept as he recounted to Wolff his efforts to protect Stoddart and Conolly 
from the emir’s plans to have them executed. He had attempted to purchase their freedom 
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for one hundred thousand tillahs, but even this did not persuade the king to release them. 
Apparently as a result of this, the king had begun withholding his wages and plotting to 
kill him. In retaliation, the nayeb told Wolff that he would be willing to support a British 
invasion of Bukhara for the right price (an offer Wolff emphatically refused).37  
According to his instructions from the Stoddart and Conolly Committee, Wolff 
was free to return to England as soon as he had determined definitively Stoddart and 
Conolly’s fate. Initially, Wolff was told that he would be able to leave only a few days 
after writing officially to Grover for the emir on 5 May 1844, in order to confirm 
Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths.38 Shortly after receiving this promise, however, Nasrullah 
imprisoned Wolff in retaliation for the imprisonment of the Bukharan ambassador in 
Persia, of which Nasrullah had just received reports and which had been arranged by the 
British ambassador at Tehran.39 As a prisoner of the emir, however, Wolff was forced to 
stay in the nayeb’s home. Prolonged close proximity convinced Wolff that the nayeb, 
rather than the emir, was ultimately responsible for Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths. On 
one occasion, Wolff was enraged by what her perceived as the nayeb’s failure to protect 
him from the threatening behavior of the emir, and fiercely accused him of having 
orchestrated the executions. In that moment, the nayeb admits to a leading role proudly.40 
Wolff publically denounced the nayeb from the first pages of his book, because of this 
exchange, calling him a “bloodhound,”41 a “foul miscreant,”42 and a “villain.”43 
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Wolff’s final analysis of his mission to Bukhara is consumed with discussion of 
British prestige in the region. In conversation with the emir and his ministers, Wolff had 
frequently emphasized the military power and moral superiority of Britain.44 Now, 
speaking to the British themselves, he wrote that Britain was able to punish Bukhara 
militarily for the treatment Stoddart and Conolly received, either by attacking from Sind 
or by enlisting the assistance of the Persian military.45 To fail to do so, Wolff argued, 
would be to risk “all the moral influence [Birtain] now possesses” in the region; 
furthermore, it would encourage other Central Asian states to imitate Bukhara’s 
behavior.46 The prospect of forfeiting this influence to the likes of Emir Nasrullah and 
Abdul Samut Khan made the loss still greater: not only were these men morally 
impoverished, in Wolff’s analysis, but they also belonged to a culture fundamentally 
inferior to British culture. 
Given Wolff’s deep-seated distrust of the Bukharan authorities, it is worthwhile to 
examine the precautions he took for his own safety prior to his arrival in the city. Wolff 
was willing to undertake the journey to Bukhara with minimal government protection for 
two reasons: his prior experience of the region and his status as an ordained religious 
authority. Because he had travelled in the Near East and Central Asia previously, he was 
familiar with the hospitality customs he would encounter,47 he was known to the Jewish 
communities along his route,48 and he held a passport given him by the emir of Bukhara 
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during his previous stay there.49 Ultimately, however, Wolff believed that his identity as 
an ordained Christian missionary offered his greatest security. This confidence had a 
spiritual dimension (he believed that he was doing the will of God, and that God would 
protect him from or expose him to physical harm as He deemed right), but there was also 
a pragmatic element to his reliance on his position. By traveling in the character of a 
Christian “derveesh,” Wolff hoped to protect himself against the accusations of spying 
that had brought about Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths. A cleric carrying a Bible would be 
seen as an unlikely spy, he hoped, and therefore he would not be suspected of harboring 
political motives for visiting the region.50 He would also benefit from the respect 
customarily accorded to religious authorities in the region.51 Wolff could honestly adopt 
the character of a cleric with the knowledge that the memory of his previous journey to 
Bukhara, in addition to reports of his missionary work elsewhere in the region, would 
confirm that this was in fact his true identity. Grover, by contrast, would have required 
letters from the British government certifying that he was a British officer, and not a spy. 
By providing him with such letters, however, the Foreign Office would have been 
investing his mission with too official a character for the government’s comfort.  
Thus Wolff’s willingness to undertake the mission to Bukhara was essential to 
Grover’s success in compelling the Foreign Office to respond to the rumors of Stoddart 
and Conolly’s execution. Unwilling to travel to Bohkara himself without official 
authorization from the British government, Grover had reached an impasse in his project 
prior to receiving Wolff’s letter offering to undertake the journey. Without an agent 
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willing to travel to Bukhara in order to corroborate or refute the various rumors filtering 
into the Foreign Office and the British press, Grover’s ability to continue bringing the 
issue before Lord Aberdeen was limited, and his concerns were easily dismissed. With 
Wolff “in the field” as a new source of potentially more reliable information, however, 
Grover was able to command greater attention within the Foreign Office. 
Though Wolff travelled to Bukhara without the official sanction of the British 
government, he did not travel entirely without its support. Lord Aberdeen agreed to aid 
Wolff as much as he was able (though he maintained that Stoddart and Conolly were 
likely dead), and contacted British ambassadors in the cities through which he would 
travel on his behalf.52 Wolff described these efforts on his behalf gratefully in the papers 
prior to his departure from England.53 He also frequently praised the generosity of the 
British representatives who received him along his route in his letters to Grover, and 
these notes of appreciation generally found their way, in whole or in part, into the papers 
as well.54 Wolff expressed gratitude to Colonel Sheil (who had passed to London one of 
the earliest reports of the executions) particularly in many of these letters, although he 
still found space to be critical of some aspects of Sheil’s treatment of him.55  
The press took particular interest in the extent of the government’s support for 
Wolff’s mission. The Morning Chronicle, reporting on a public meeting about Wolff’s 
proposed mission with disappointingly low attendance, attributed the apparent apathy of 
the public to the government’s lack of leadership.  
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We believe the truth to be, that the public, not seeing the government 
(which is the proper party to act in the matter) take any active steps for the 
restoration of those officers, or at any rate for ascertaining their fate, are 
persuaded that the results of a personal mission are so hazardous, that 
under the circumstances all thought of such an undertaking had better be 
abandoned.56 
In spite of this, most comments in the press about the government’s involvement with 
Wolff’s mission suggest that the “non-official” support, consisting mostly of aid offered 
by British envoys, was viewed favorably. Wolff himself seems to be responsible for 
much of this favorable view with his repeated praise of the government officials he 
encountered. In some cases, news reports divide the credit for the mission’s predicted 
success between Wolff and the government. As Wolff was travelling through Persia on 
his way to Bukhara, the London Evening Standard reported that Wolff could not have 
arrived safely in Tehran without Aberdeen’s assistance, and that because of it, Wolff 
might finally succeed in resolving the conflicting reports about them.57 Reporting on 
Wolff’s progress toward Bukhara in November of 1843, however, the Morning Post 
commented that “neither the British government nor the India Company have 
contributed” to the payment of Wolff’s expenses for the trip.58 The Evening Chronicle 
makes the same observation, and then states that the government’s failure to support 
Wolff’s mission was “a disgrace to the British name throughout Europe.”59 
Wolff’s contribution to Grover’s campaign extended beyond his ability to travel 
to Bukhara. He was comfortable in the role of a public figure, both in person and in print, 
having both preached and published extensively by the time he offered to travel to 
Bukhara. Several of Wolff’s many published memoirs have already appeared as sources !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in this thesis. The number of audiences to which he spoke were no less impressive than 
the number of books he published. According to one memoir, his audiences outside of 
Britain included Muslim clerics and British residents in Lucknow, a group of British 
officials in Calcutta, and the United Stated Congress.60 Although Wolff seems never to 
have published his sermons, he did mention their contents in his writings. Many of them 
emphasized the imminent return of Christ, a topic he frequently addressed during his 
travels, both when speaking to Christian audiences and as a form of evangelism.61  
As an ordained minister and a missionary, Wolff commanded a privileged status 
in early Victorian society as a Christian missionary, which he used to draw attention to 
Stoddart and Conolly’s plight. Missionaries—particularly those who were capable self-
publicists, as Wolff seems to have been—were treated as celebrities in Victorian 
society.62 Their reports of their activities enjoyed wide circulation, either as books or in 
periodicals published by missionary societies. One such book, authored by a missionary 
to Polynesia, sold approximately 40,000 copies between 1837 and 1840.63 Wolff was 
clearly capable of using his writing to promote himself, if the number of volumes he 
published can be taken as an indication. Further evidence of his popularity lies in the 
wide geographical distribution of the papers that carried information about his decision to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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travel to Bukhara on Stoddart and Conolly’s behalf. These included papers published in 
Waterford, Ireland;64 Leeds, England;65 southern Wales;66 and Inverness, Scotland67 as 
well as in London, where Grover lived, and the surrounding areas.  
The evidence of Wolff’s influence on Grover’s campaign takes concrete form 
when we note the change in the venue of the public meetings connected with Grover’s 
campaign. The first meeting, which established the Stoddart and Conolly Committee, 
occurred in the Crown and Anchor Tavern in London. Because he and his family were 
living in Bruges, Belgium, at the time, Wolff was absent, but he had committed to 
travelling to Bukhara before it occurred.68 The meetings that Wolff attended, in contrast 
to this initial gathering, were held in far grander spaces than the Crown and Anchor. The 
first, which occurred shortly before Wolff’s departure for Bukhara, took place in the 
Hanover-Square Rooms, an opulent space built in 1833 and generally used for concerts.69 
In its account of this meeting, the Morning Chronicle noted disappointedly that the room 
was “not half full” and that the overwhelming majority of them were women.70 Whatever 
inferences this might introduce about the author’s misogyny, it is worth noting as a 
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contrast to the first meeting, which occurred in a space catering to primarily male 
clients71 and whose attendees were described as “gentlemen.”72  
The public meeting held on Wolff’s return to Bukhara marks an even more 
significant departure from the relatively humble origins of Grover’s committee. When it 
was completed in 1831, the large room at Exeter Hall seated four thousand occupants. In 
subsequent years, however, additional levels of seating were added to accommodate even 
larger audiences.73 In 1840, Exeter Hall hosted the World Antislavery Convention, at 
which both noted abolitionist Thomas Clarkson and Prince Albert spoke.74 When Wolff 
returned to England, it was in the large room of Exeter Hall that he presented the results 
of his journey. Once again many of the attendees were women, but on this occasion every 
seat was taken.75 Such a grand and prestigious venue marks a striking contrast to the 
Crown and Anchor, and speaks to both the size and type of audience Wolff was able to 
command.  His involvement in Grover’s campaign thus not only furthered Grover’s 
efforts to gain the attention of the Foreign Office and the press, but it also fundamentally 
altered the composition of the audience most likely to attend Grover’s events and 
contribute financially to his campaign. !
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Conclusion 
 
Stoddart and Conolly largely vanished from the press following Wolff’s return 
from Bokhara. Several books were published, however, in which their story was told. Sir 
John William Kaye wrote extensively on Conolly in his Lives of Indian Officers, which 
appeared in 1867, for example.1 In 1899, F,H. Skrine and E.D. Ross, a former member of 
the Indian Civil Service and a professor at University College, London, respectively, 
published a history of what was by then Russian Turkestan. The volume begins with 
Alexander the Great’s expedition into southern Central Asia, but also includes a chapter 
mentioning Stoddart and Conolly entitled “Amīr Nasrullah, A Bokhāran Nero.”2 
This thesis has argued that the discussion of Stoddart and Conolly’s execution and 
imprisonment among their British contemporaries centered not on the events of their time 
in Bukhara but on a campaign to establish the extent of the government’s responsibility 
for the tragedy and, in many cases, to prompt the government to respond accordingly. If 
this was indeed the motivation of Grover, Wolff, and the many nameless authors of 
articles published in British papers, then we may reasonably conclude that they failed in 
at least part of their mission. They succeeded in establishing a remarkably unanimous 
consensus that the government bore some responsibility toward Stoddart and Conolly, 
and indeed that it actually bore some responsibility for their deaths. But they failed to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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inspire the type of government response they felt the tragedy to require. It is true that 
Peel’s government granted Stoddart’s sisters a government pension of £150 in 1844,3 but 
this was minor compared to the response desired by some of Stoddart and Conolly’s 
advocates. Macnaghten, as we have seen, hoped to launch a campaign from Afghanistan 
to secure their release,4 a stance that others adopted after Macnaghten’s death when 
reports of Stoddart and Conolly’s execution reached Britain.5 The British government 
seems never to have seriously considered either these or Grover and Wolff’s later pleas 
for military action against Bukhara, and as a result Stoddart and Conolly’s 
executioners—or murderers, as they were consistently termed in the press—faced no 
penalty for their actions.  
Not only did the guilty go unpunished, but the man Wolff determined to be the 
primary villain in the affair, the infamous Abdul Samut Khan, was effectively 
posthumously rewarded for his role in the deaths of the officers. In 1883, the nayeb’s son 
wrote a letter to the Government of India, requesting that the government pay him the 
sum his father loaned to Captain Conolly during the latter’s imprisonment at Bokhara. 
According to this letter, Abdul Samut Khan had been executed by the emir of Bokhara 
shortly after Stoddart and Conolly met their end, on the rather extraordinary grounds that 
he had been too generous in his treatment of them. Although Wolff had described him as 
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the primary cause of Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths (more so even than the emir himself), 
the British government acceded to the request and reimbursed the nayeb’s son.6 
Thus the significance of the British campaign on Stoddart and Conolly’s behalf 
surely does not lie in its long-term success. Its immediate achievements in creating and 
maintaining public interest in the fate of the officers were, this thesis has argued, 
admittedly noteworthy.  They grew out of a collaboration between remarkable men who 
benefitted from an array of preexisting social structures, from the coffee house as a 
source of news to the aura of celebrity that accompanied a successful missionary in 
Victorian society. Still, these successes, however remarkable, were partial and transient. 
 The lasting significance of the Stoddart and Conolly affair lies in its role as an 
early phase of a debate revisited throughout Victorian history (and indeed since that time) 
regarding the extent of the government’s obligation to protect its citizens abroad. The 
same question of responsibility that shaped this crisis emerged repeatedly in subsequent 
years, on several occasions in contexts that have remained prominent episodes in British 
history. A mere five years after Wolff returned to England, for example, Parliament 
found itself embroiled in the Don Pacifico affair. Don, or David, Pacifico was a Jewish 
British subject living in Greece who became the victim of an anti-Semitic mob which, the 
spring of 1847, entered his home and damaged or stole property and money collectively 
valued at over £30,000.7 The Greek court persistently refused to reimburse Pacifico for 
his losses for several years, and it was only in 1850, when the British naval fleet in the 
Mediterranean assembled outside Athens, that the situation was resolved. In July of 1850, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Palmerston gave a speech in Parliament justifying the use of military action to end the 
standoff: “a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the 
watchful eye and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and 
wrong.”8  
 More than thirty years after the Don Pacifico affair, the British government once 
again faced crisis involving British citizens abroad. In early 1884, General Charles 
George Gordon received orders to go to the Sudan, where the British public hoped he 
would be able to salvage British interests in what was rapidly becoming a desperate 
situation.9 By December of the same year, Gordon found himself trapped at Khartoum, 
besieged by the forces of the Mahdi. Gordon, like Stoddart, was offered the opportunity 
to depart for England—though in Gordon’s case, this came not from an intermediary 
power, but from his opponent, the Mahdi, himself, who respected Gordon both as a 
soldier and as a devout practitioner of his faith. Like Stoddart, Gordon felt that his duty to 
his country required that he remain where he was. In the end, the Mahdi’s forces attacked 
Khartoum shortly before a British relief force arrived, and Gordon was beheaded. He was 
given no quiet grave for a second Saaleh Muhammad to visit, however: his head was 
mounted on a pole and displayed outside the Mahdi’s tent. The British public were 
outraged at this humiliation of a national hero, and once again blamed the British 
government for the death of a British envoy at the hands of a foreign power. In some 
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responses to the crisis, Gladstone’s nickname initials, G.O.M. (standing for “Grand Old 
Man”) were reversed to M.O.G.: “Murderer of Gordon.”10 
 Both Gordon’s death and the Don Pacifico affair involve themes that emerged 
decades earlier in the Stoddart and Conolly crisis. Gordon, like Stoddart and Conolly, 
was held up as an honorable man and officer, and therefore as a figure whom Britain 
ought to have protected. Christianity, evangelicalism specifically, was central to this 
story, as it had been in the Stoddart and Conolly affair. The public outcry following 
Gordon’s death resembles, on a larger scale, the outcry that the rumors of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s execution prompted. Even Palmerston’s claim that British citizens abroad had 
the right to expect the protection of their government seems to be a more forcefully 
articulated version of the conclusion some commentators on the Stoddart and Conolly 
affair reached years earlier. 
The Stoddart and Conolly affair thus constituted an early instance of a problem 
that recurred throughout the Victorian era. Yet previous scholarship has failed to consider 
it in this light. Most scholars have discussed Stoddart and Conolly much as conservative 
newspapers did in the wake of the British retreat from Kabul: as more or less innocent 
victims of a tragedy they had no hand in creating. The fate of Shah Shuja’s government 
in Afghanistan, like the fate of the failed Russian expedition to Khiva and Anglo-Russian 
competition in Central Asia generally, undeniably influenced the treatment Stoddart and 
Conolly received at Bukhara. We cannot understand even their presence in the region 
outside the context of those events. However, to limit inquiry into their fates to the ebb 
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and flow of British interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia is to ignore entirely the 
debate that surrounded them in Britain. 
 This debate on the government’s responsibility toward Stoddart and Conolly was 
initially conducted in the press and in Parliament without the guidance of any single 
leader. Rather, multiple voices offered varying evidence in relation to two key issues: the 
extent to which Britain’s defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War was the cause of the 
officers’ deaths, and the role of their character and Christianity in determining the 
appropriate response to their fate. Although the political persuasion of a paper influenced 
its treatment of the British retreat from Kabul—the conservative papers opposed British 
interference in Afghanistan and were therefore quick to note its failure—papers of all 
political slants tended to agree that the British government bore a responsibility to the 
officers it sent abroad, though they might disagree about what that responsibility entailed. 
As a personal friend of Colonel Stoddart, Grover felt that discussion in the press 
and in Parliament was accomplishing too little, and stepped forward to create and lead an 
organized campaign on behalf of his friend and his friend’s fellow-prisoner. Though his 
early, solitary efforts to generate interest in Stoddart and Conolly at the Foreign Office 
failed, he obtained considerably greater influence once backed by the Stoddart and 
Conolly Committee and Dr. Wolff. With this support, Grover was able to advocate his 
cause regularly in the press. He sent much of the same information to the press and the 
Foreign Office, and was more successful in gaining Aberdeen’s attention than he had 
been when he proposed to travel to Bukhara. Grover thus succeeded with the committee’s 
support where he had failed alone. His publications, which provided the fullest 
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articulation of his convictions regarding the government’s responsibility for Stoddart and 
Conolly’s deaths, benefitted from this success, and were widely reviewed and approved. 
 Grover’s campaign would never have gained such momentum, however, had 
Wolff not agreed to join forces with him. His letters heightened the drama of Grover’s 
campaign and provided Grover with material to send to the newspapers, while the 
memoir he published on his return to Britain capitalized on both the ethnological theory 
of the day and the general interest in distant lands. More significantly, however, Wolff 
brought with him a degree of celebrity as a well-travelled missionary (and an 
accomplished self-publicist), attracting the attention of evangelical Christians who might 
not otherwise have supported Grover’s campaign. 
 While this thesis contributes to a greater understanding of Victorian-era debates 
regarding the government’s responsibility to its citizens abroad, and to the role of public 
pressure and press involvement in these debates, there is unquestionably more work to be 
done. Of particular importance to this thesis is the notable lack of scholarship on Britons 
and other Europeans captured, imprisoned, or killed in Central Asia that relies on non-
British sources.11 Postnikov’s commentary on sources culled from Russian archives 
suggests that there may well be a wealth of material there that is currently little used in 
English-language scholarship on this topic. More disturbing than the underuse of Russian 
sources is the complete absence of any reference to Bukharan archival sources in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 I am, unfortunately, only able to speak to the absence of such work in English. It is of 
course possible that Russian or Uzbek scholars, or scholars of other nationalities, have 
addressed these questions, and that their work simply has not been translated into 
English. 
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published material on Stoddart and Conolly.12 Without such materials, scholars have no 
means of evaluating the vitriolic claims made by Stoddart, Conolly, Wolff, and others 
about the Bukharan leadership, and only limited understanding of the role regional 
politics played in Stoddart and Conolly’s treatment. 
 Although I unfortunately could not address the underuse of Russian and Bukharan 
sources in this thesis, the consideration of Stoddart and Conolly in a domestic British 
context, as well as in the context of the Great Game, represents a positive step toward a 
fuller understanding of the Stoddart and Conolly crisis. As this project has demonstrated, 
an examination of sources rarely used in the standard histories of the crisis—particularly 
newspaper articles and Grover’s writings—reveals that the Stoddart and Conolly affair 
took on a broader significance than simply its possible impact on British policy in 
Afghanistan. The popular response to Stoddart and Conolly’s deaths began with little 
more than the expression of similar sentiments in newspapers across Britain. Under 
Grover’s guidance, however, it developed into a movement that capitalized on the power 
of the press and missionary celebrity to draw supporters. In all phases of the crisis, the 
disparate components of the movement were united in the conviction that Stoddart and 
Conolly had been abandoned by the government they served—that they were as much the 
“Victims of the Downing Street” as they were victims of the Bukharan government.13
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Andreas Wilde, “Creating the Façade of a Despotic State,” in Explorations in the 
Social History of Modern Central Asia (19th - Early 20th Century), ed. Paolo Sartori, 
Brill’s Inner Asian Library, Volume 29 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 272, n. 21.  It is difficult to 
determine the precise contents of the archives Wilde mentions in this note, but it seems 
possible that they contain material that could illuminate some aspects of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s treatment in Bukhara. 
13 Morning Post, 22 April 1845. 
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encouraging and dismantling slavery. His discussion of British emancipation, the 
immediate context for Stoddart and Conolly’s missions to Central Asia, is 
particularly relevant to my research. 
 
Fenton, Laurence. Palmerston and the Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public 
Opinion in Mid-Victorian Britain. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013. 
 
Fenton argues that Palmerston was generally extremely successful in gaining the 
support of the British press throughout his political career, a fact which 
contributed to his popularity as a public official. The Times, however, treated him 
with animosity. What Palmerston and The Times shared, according to Fenton, was 
an understanding of the implication of public opinion in British politics. The 
Times (and other nineteenth century newspapers, for that matter) claimed to 
represent public opinion, and opposed Palmerston; Palmerston, meanwhile, 
recognized the role that public opinion had in the success or failure of his career. 
The portion of this volume relevant to my study discusses the importance of 
government connections for the press in obtaining information about the British 
government’s relationship to foreign powers. 
 
Elbourne, Elisabeth. “Religion in the British Empire.” In The British Empire: Themes 
and Perspectives ed. Sarah Stockwell, 131-156. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008.  
 
 In this essay, Elbourne analyzes the historiography of the relationship between 
Christianity and the British Empire. She finds two overlapping historiographical 
traditions, one analyzing Christian institutions (churches, missionary societies, 
etc.) and one considering the less structural and more personal elements of faith 
and emotion. I have relied on her insight into the position of missionaries in the 
empire. She argues that missionaries not only evangelized, but also participated in 
social reform campaigns (such as the abolition movement), and even played a role 
in the development of British policy in an imperial territory on a local level. 
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Ellis, Aytoun. The Penny Universities: A History of the Coffee Houses. London: Secker 
and Warburg, 1956. 
 
This is not a particularly academic volume; the author mentions few of his 
resources and makes no use of footnotes or endnotes. Most of the discussion 
revolves around the types of intellectual and social engagement that took pace in 
coffee houses from their earliest appearance in England until the end of the 
eighteenth century. The final chapter, devoted to the decline of the British coffee 
house, was most relevant to this project. In it, Ellis states that coffee houses had 
mostly vanished by the beginning of the nineteenth century (though as I have 
noted, this is a contested point). 
 
Ellis, Markman. The Coffee House: A Cultural History. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 2004. 
 
Unlike other histories of the coffeehouse discussed here, Markman Ellis’s volume 
incorporates discussion of non-British coffeehouses into his volume. His account 
begins in the seventeenth century and concludes with an epilogue on Starbucks. 
He emphasizes the cultural and societal impact of the coffeehouse, which often 
served throughout its history as a space for political debate. His commentary on 
the decline of coffee houses in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is 
particularly relevant for my research. 
 
Harms, Robert, Bernard K. Freamon, and David W. Blight, eds. Indian Ocean Slavery in 
the Age of Abolition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.  
 
 This edited volume explores the nature of slavery in the Indian Ocean World, 
focusing primarily on the nineteenth century. Contributors describe the nature of 
Indian Ocean slavery (which differed from trans-Atlantic slavery significantly); 
Islamic views of slavery and slavery practices, as well as Islamic abolition 
movements; and the impact of abolition movements on the Indian Ocean world. 
Indian Ocean slavery is relevant to this thesis as a parallel to Central Asian 
slavery, which is considerably less researched than Indian Ocean slavery, and as 
the form of non-trans-Atlantic slavery with which the British abolitionists of the 
1830s and 1840s would have been most familiar. Gwyn Campbell’s essay on the 
nature of Indian Ocean slavery between 1800 and 1900 provides helpful 
background to abolitionists growing demands, as of the 1830s and 1840s, that all 
forms of slavery be condemned as immoral. 
 
Hilton, Boyd. The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and 
Economic Thought, 1785-1865. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
 Hilton argues that the rise of evangelicalism in the early nineteenth century did 
more than simply generate missionary societies and social reform organizations; it 
also brought about a new way of considering Britain’s economic policy. As 
reimagined under evangelical influence, the ideal national economy valued 
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frugality and honorable conduct in the economic sphere, as well as specific 
policies such as free trade and the use of a gold standard. Hilton’s work is 
necessarily focused specifically on the impact of evangelicalism on British 
economics. Nevertheless the underlying principle of national honor, which Hilton 
exposes as a foundation of this philosophy, also applies to the foreign policy of 
the early Victorian era and specifically to Stoddart and Conolly’s missions to 
Central Asia and popular evaluations of the appropriate government response to 
their deaths. 
 
Holdsworth, Mary. Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History of the Khanates 
of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva. Oxford: Central Asian Research Centre, 1959. 
 
Holdsworth provides a remarkably detailed account of the political, economic, 
legal, and military affairs of the khanates of Bokhara, Kokand, and Khiva based 
principally on Soviet scholarship. She directs relatively little of her energy toward 
British presence in the region in the early stages of the Great Game, focusing 
instead largely on the period following the Russian conquest of the region in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Holdsworth’s account addresses questions regarding 
internal politics and daily life in this region that seem to be neither asked nor 
answered elsewhere. For example, her research allows her to comment on the 
literacy of the populations of the khanates, as well as the role of intellectuals in 
the governance of each. Most useful for my purposes is the information she 
provides on the structure of the government in Bokhara; official titles are often 
referenced in passing, particularly in the writings of Wolff and Grover, with little 
or no explanation of the duties or responsibilities of the position on question. 
 
Holladay, J. Douglas. “English Evangelicalism, 1820-1850: Diversity and Unity in ‘Vital 
Religion.’” Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church 51 (1982): 
157. Accessed 3 February 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42974720.  
 
 Holladay explores the meaning of “vital religion” in the context of Victorian 
society, arguing that it presented itself in society in a variety of social reform 
organizations and philanthropic endeavors. He suggests that different elements of 
the Victorian evangelical community saw these organizations and endeavors as 
means to different ends, however; those who belonged to the Anglican Church 
were little inclined to see them as tools for significant cultural change. 
Nonconformists (non-Anglicans), however, recognized the potential power of 
these institutions as instruments of social change. For the purposes of this thesis, 
Holladay’s emphasis on the diversity of Victorian evangelicalism is significant. 
 
Hopkins, B.D. “Race, Sex and Slavery: ‘Forced Labour’ in Central Asia and Afghanistan 
in the Early 19th Century.” Modern Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2008): 629-671. 
Accessed 13 September 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20488036. 
 
Hopkins’ work analyzes the nature of slavery in Bokhara and surrounding 
kingdoms in the decades preceding and including Conolly’s expedition to 
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Bokhara. This study is a means of “bridging the gap,” so to speak, between the 
literature on British abolition movements of the early 19th century in Britain, on 
the Atlantic, and India on the one hand and the Central Asian situation on the 
other. Hopkins describes the tasks for which slave labor was employed in 
Bokharan society, the slaves’ social status, and the experience of slaves who 
managed to purchase their own freedom. This is an essential study for my project 
because of the significance of Bokharan slavery to Conolly’s mission in Bokhara, 
and because of the widespread interest in the issue among most of the British 
commentators on the region. 
 
Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: 
Kondansha USA, 1994. 
 
Hopkirk provides a sweeping narrative of British and Russian activity in Central 
Asia and Afghanistan between the dawn of the nineteenth century and beginning 
of the twentieth. His is a work of popular history, with minimal citations and 
comparatively little analysis of the events he reports. However, he successfully 
portrays the many fronts on which the British were competing throughout this 
period. He addresses the fates of Stoddart and Conolly in some detail, and while 
the information he discusses is valuable in its own right for this project, his work 
is useful particularly because of his ability to place the Stoddart and Conolly 
affair in the context of other events of the same period.  
 
Johnston, Anna. “British Missionary Publishing, Missionary Celebrity, and Empire.” 
Nineteenth-Century Prose 32 (2005): 20-43. 
 
 Johnston’s article examines the intentional cultivation of public attention and even 
celebrity by missionary societies and individual missionaries during the Victorian 
period. Focusing on the London Missionary Society particularly, she argues that 
the society encouraged its missionaries to write frequent reports, which were then 
published in a variety of newsletters and magazines each designed to appeal to a 
specific audience. She also examines the careers of individual successful 
missionaries, who, she argues, were successful largely because of their ability to 
promote themselves as public figures. 
 
Leach, Hugh. “From Bavaria to Bokhara to Isle Brewers: The Extraordinary Life and 
Times of Dr the Revd Juseph Wolff, DD.” Asian Affairs 38: 3 (2007), 322-328. 
Accessed 26 October 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068370701538456. 
 
 Leach provides a brief bibliography of Dr. Joseph Wolff, the evangelical 
missionary who travelled to Bukhara to determine what of the many rumors about 
Stoddart and Conolly’s death or ongoing imprisonment there might be true. 
Although not written for academics, this primer on Wolff’s life is useful as a 
guide to the numerous travel narratives and memoirs Wolff published. The 
narrative is structured chronologically, with little analysis. 
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Lunn, Henry C. “The Hanover-Square Rooms.” The Musical Times and Singing Class 
Circular 16 (1875): 741-742. Accessed 7 February 2016. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/335288. 
 
Lunn’s brief article consists of a history of the Hanover-Square Rooms, a 
performance venue in nineteenth century London generally used for concerts. 
Lunn describes an opulent space in which renowned musicians sometimes 
performed. King George III himself attended balls held in Hanover-Square, 
according to Lunn. This information is relevant to the Stoddart and Conolly crisis 
because one of the public meeting of the Stoddart and Conolly was held in this 
space. 
 
Lunt, James. Bokhara Burnes. London: Faber and Faber, 1969. 
 
Lunt’s work is a biography of Alexander Burnes, who was unquestionably the 
most famous early Victorian visitor to Bokhara. Lunt is not solely focused on 
Burnes’s time in Bokhara, however. Following his departure from Bokhara, 
Burnes commented on several occasions on Conolly’s ambitions for his mission in 
Central Asia and Bokhara, and on Stoddart’s imprisonment there. As Britain’s 
most knowledgeable commentator on Bokharan affairs, his opinion was widely 
perceived to be of significance, though the government often refused to follow his 
advice. His murder, which occurred when the British were pushed out of Kabul, 
was part of the series of events that seems to have led at last to Stoddart’s and 
Conolly’s executions. 
 
Maclean, Fitzroy. A Person from England: And Other Travellers. London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1958. 
 
 Maclean begins his work with a lengthy chapter recounting the events of the 
imprisonment and execution of Stoddart and Conolly, as well as the efforts made 
after their deaths to learn what had become of them. Unlike Hopkirk, Maclean 
does not write about these events as one piece of a larger narrative, though he does 
discuss other events (for example, the British defeat in Afghanistan) as influencing 
the outcome of the Stoddart-Conolly affair. He narrates these events from a 
distinctly governmental perspective, with no reference to popular portrayal or 
public response. As a result, his focus is quite different from the one I have 
adopted. However, he provides valuable (if indirect, given his propensity not to 
cite specific sources) insight into governmental perspectives on the crisis. His 
information was invaluable to me in the drafting of my Copeland Fund grant 
proposal. 
 
Macrory, Patrick. Signal Catastrophe: The Story of the Disastrous Retreat from Kabul 
1842. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966.  
 
Macrory’s volume is a history of the first Afghan war (despite the title, the 
narrative actually begins with the British arrival in Kabul). As the newspaper 
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articles referencing Stoddart’s imprisonment make clear, the events of this war 
were intimately interwoven with the treatment Stoddart (and eventually Conolly 
as well) received at the hands of the emir in Bokhara. From the British 
perspective, the wild fluctuations in Stoddart’s standing (imprisoned with 
murderers in one news report, released and training the emir’s artillery seemingly 
days later) seem arbitrary. However, correlated with the success and faltering of 
British efforts to restore Shah Shujah to the throne in Kabul, these abrupt changes 
make considerably more sense. From the emir’s perspective, victorious British 
forces in Afghanistan pose a potential threat to his sovereignty; British military 
weakness in Afghanistan is evidence that he need not worry about offending the 
British with his mistreatment of their envoy.  
 
Melton, James Van Horn. Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Melton’s volume chronicles the development of a new type of “public” during the 
Enlightenment, a public whose role was to observe and evaluate. The idea of 
public as audience, Melton argues, was an innovation of the Enlightenment. His 
account includes evidence from England, France, and Germany, and addresses a 
variety of public practices, including reading, writing, the performing arts, and 
even drinking. In relation to this thesis, his chapter on drinking is most salient. 
Because, as Melton notes, the tavern was a somewhat less respectable place to 
gather in the nineteenth century than it had been in the eighteenth, Grover’s 
decision to hold the first meeting of the Stoddart and Conolly Committee in the 
Crown and Anchor Tavern is noteworthy, with implications for the audience 
Grover would be able to draw. 
 
Meyer, Karl E. and Shareen Blair Brysac. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and 
the Race for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Basic Books, 1999. 
 
The account of Stoddart and Conolly offered by Meyer and Brysac is perhaps 
most similar to that of Hopkirk, though Hopkirk addresses the affair at 
considerably greater length. Like Hopkirk, Meyer and Brysac treat the Stoddart-
Conolly affair as one episode among many in the British bid for influence in 
Central Asia. Again like Hopkirk, and also like Maclean, their account is almost 
wholly driven by official sources and the basic narrative that Wolff and Grover 
provide (though without the harsh commentary that accompanied it). Meyer and 
Brysac write at some length about the First Anglo-Afghan War, as well as about 
earlier British visitors to Bokhara. Their account thus provides valuable 
information about the phase of the Great Game of which the Stoddart-Conolly 
affair was a part. 
 
Morgan, Gerald. Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810—1895. London: Frank 
Cass, 1981.   
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Morgan begins his history of the Great Game (a term coined by Captain Conolly 
himself, by all accounts) early in the nineteenth century, and thus offers far 
greater detail about the gradual intensification of the rivalry over Central Asia 
than do those historians (like Evgenij Sergeev) whose histories begin with the 
Russian military conquest of Central Asia. The details of this early history, though 
often treated as relatively inconsequential, are critical to an understanding of why 
Stoddart, Conolly, and men like them traveled to seemingly inconsequential 
regions such as Bokhara. Fear that Russia might invade India from the north made 
Afghanistan, Bokhara, and other regions like them critically important in the 
geopolitical game the British sought to play. Morgan is unconcerned with 
Stoddart and Conolly, but he offers a useful history of the conflict in which they 
played a role, and of its broader implications for Britain and Russia. 
 
Melnyk, Julie. Victorian Religion: Faith and Life in Britain. Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 2008. 
 
Melnyk argues that it is impossible to understand the Victorians without 
understanding their religion and its manifestations in their culture. She presents 
the complexity of Victorian religious expression, which involved many 
denominations and sects, and attempts to illustrate religion’s impact on British 
culture and its meaning for those who participated in it. Her chapter on “Religion 
and Reform,” which discusses the many reform movements that developed out of 
Victorian evangelical fervor, is particularly relevant for my understanding of the 
descriptions of Stoddart and Conolly’s Christian character, as well as for the 
context of Wolff’s celebrity in Britain. 
 
Noelle, Christine. State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 
Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863). Richmond, England: Curzon, 1997. 
 
Unlike the other histories of the first Anglo-Afghan War I consulted during my 
research, Noelle’s volume takes a deliberately Afghan perspective. She frames the 
war not in the context of British imperial ambitions or the Anglo-Russian rivalry 
of the Great Game, but in terms of Afghanistan’s own political structure. In her 
narrative, the British-led Army of the Indus appears on the Afghan border just as 
Dost Muhammad was attempting to solidify his control over Afghanistan, having 
deposed the previous ruling family with his ascent to the throne. This work is 
useful as a counterbalance to other histories of the Anglo-Afghan war, which 
recognize the many differing opinions within the British government and the East 
India Company regarding the wisdom of invading Afghanistan, but do not discuss 
similar complexities among the Afghans themselves. 
 
Norris, J. A. The First Afghan War: 1838—1842. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967. 
 
Norris’s history of the first Afghan War, like Macrory’s, provides essential 
information about the context in which the Stoddart-Conolly affair occurred. 
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Unlike Macrory, Norris chooses not to focus on a specific episode in the war, and 
the detail he provides about the background and initial stages of the conflict are 
invaluable for my purposes. Because the British fared poorly in the conflict, the 
emir became convinced that there would be no repercussions for his abuse of 
Colonel Stoddart (and eventually Captain Conolly). At one point during the 
conflict, British newspapers reported that Stoddart and Dost Mohammed, the ruler 
the British had removed from power in Afghanistan, were both imprisoned in 
Bokhara. At a later date, the same papers reported that, while Colonel Stoddart 
remained in prison, Dost Mohammed had been released and was in favor with the 
emir. Such circumstances illustrate the central role that British activity in 
Afghanistan seems to have played in the Stoddart-Conolly affair. 
 
Nutting, Anthony. Gordon of Khartoum: Martyr and Misfit. New York: Clarkson N. 
Potter, Inc., 1966. 
  
Nutting’s volume is a history of the life of General Gordon, who was killed at 
Khartoum, with particular reference to Gordon’s place within Victorian society. 
Of interest for this thesis particularly is the section on Gordon’s death, which 
parallels in some respects the deaths of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly. 
 
Olsaretti, Alessandro. “Urban Culture, Curiosity, and the Aesthetics of Distance: The 
Representation of Picturesque Carnivals in Early Victorian Travelogues to the 
Levant.” Social History 32 (2007): 247-270. Accessed 7 February 2016. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4287450.  
 
 Olsaretti argues that early Victorian travelogues manifested a form of orientalism 
that emphasized (nonacademic) curiosity about distant lands. Said had written 
otherwise, having claimed that early nineteenth century orientalism was a 
predominantly academic phenomenon. Olsaretti argues, however, that the 
travelogues he examined show a delight in recording picturesque events and 
scenes that had little bearing on academic orientalism, but that correlated to 
changes in British culture that shifted carnivalesque elements out of British high 
society. This encouraged travellers to depict picturesque or carnivalesque events 
as exotic or other when they encountered them elsewhere, as such events now 
seemed unfamiliar. Wolff’s narrative of his mission to Bukhara relied on a similar 
dramatic appeal of the other, although his writing also contained elements of 
academic orientalism. 
 
Parry, Jonathan. The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
 
 Parry’s volume covers the years 1820-1886, and examines Liberalism’s role as 
the principal political movement of much of the Victorian period. He argues that 
Whig and Liberal governments responded to the upheaval of the early nineteenth 
century, brought on by economic development, a changing social order, and mass 
migration, by seeking to cultivate a stronger attachment between Britons and their 
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government, and by creating an environment in which the differences between 
people were superseded by a common belief in the rule of law. The focus of this 
volume is domestic politics, and therefore it pays relatively little attention to 
foreign policy, particularly for the period with which my research is concerned. 
However, Parry offers insight into the lasting impact of Peel’s government which 
is relevant to this thesis. 
 
Porter, Andrew, editor. The Nineteenth Century, volume 3 of The Oxford History of the 
British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
I have relied principally on two essays from this volume, both of which were 
written by Andrew Porter: “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” 
and “Religion, Missionary Enthusiasm, and Empire.” Both essays provide a 
sweeping introduction to the particular manifestations of their title themes in the 
British empire of the nineteenth century, without focusing too closely on a 
particular region. While neither essay speaks specifically of the British in Central 
Asia, they both touch on themes relevant to Grover and Wolff’s efforts to learn of 
Stoddart and Conolly’s fate. “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism” 
mentions the demographics of early nineteenth century social reform movements, 
while “Religion, Missionary Enthusiasm, and Empire” discusses the relationship 
between the missionary and imperial politics. 
 
Postnikov, Alexey V. “The Russian Mission to Bokhara in 1842 and the Fate of the 
English Emissaries Charles Stoddart and Arthur Conolly.” Almagest 4, no. 2 
(2013): 33-59.  
 
Postnikov’s work serves primarily to make available in English new information 
previously lying untranslated in Russian archives. His history of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s captivity adds relatively little to what was already known from Grover 
and Wolff, but his access to the Russian sources greatly increases available 
information about the official Russian position toward Bokhara. The 1841 
Russian embassy under Butenev arrived in Bokhara at the request of the Bokharan 
emir, who had approached the Russian government several years earlier about 
sending geologists to Bokhara to explore potential mineral riches in the country. 
This was the primary stated goal of Butenev’s mission, though the participants 
clearly sought to ascertain that Russia, rather than Britain, became the foremost 
power in the region. Butenev was under orders to attempt to secure the release of 
the British officers if possible, but the emir refused to turn them over to him. 
 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 
 
Said’s classic is, of course, indispensible to anyone interested in any component 
of the history of imperialism. Although this volume generally lacks evidence 
specific to the 1840s, I would argue that Said’s claims about western assumptions 
of passivity in the east can be generalized to include the period I discuss and the 
specific geography of Bokhara. Indeed, underlying assumptions that the British 
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should be the active force in Central Asia and Bokhara, and the Bokharans, 
passive responders, may help to explain the furor that Stoddart and Conolly affair 
created. These circumstances were an inversion of British expectations about their 
interactions with the east, and it was this quality that made Stoddart’s and 
Conolly’s imprisonment and execution so troubling to some British citizens. The 
government’s refusal to take on an active role—by launching a military campaign, 
or even by sending someone to Bokhara in the government’s name to learn of the 
men’s fate officially—only worsened the situation. 
 
Shapiro, Harry L. “The history and development of physical anthropology.” American  
 Anthropologist 61 (1959), 371-379. Accessed 3 October 2015. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/667203 
 
Shapiro traces the development of the field of physical anthropology from its 
origins in seventeenth century biological classifications. The field of physical 
anthropology (along with ethnology, which Shapiro treats as closely connected) 
only began to emerge at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth, however, and Shapiro notes that explorers and missionaries helped to 
lay the groundwork for the ethnologist’s activities. Shapiro argues, in short, that 
the fields of physical anthropology and ethnology emerged out of the intellectual 
and social context of the early nineteenth century. 
 
Soucek, Svat. A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
 A History of Inner Asia is a sweeping account of Inner Asian history which begins 
in the seventh century and concludes with several chapters on contemporary post-
Soviet Central Asia, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. Soucek devotes a chapter to 
“Bukhara, Khiva, and Khoqand in the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries,” in 
which he describes the replacement of the old Chinggisid dynasties with new 
ruling families and the gradual increase of Russian influence in the region. 
Soucek is relatively unconcerned with British influence on Bukhara, Khiva, and 
Khoqand, which had little lasting effect, and instead focuses primarily on the 
internal development of these states. 
 
Tidrick, Kathryn. Empire and the English Character: The Illusion of Authority. London: 
Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2009. 
 
Tidrick provides a series of case studies relating to the role of character in the 
administration (though not explicitly in the acquisition) of the British Empire. She 
seeks to understand how the British saw themselves in the context of their 
imperial power, particularly with regard to the use of military force. She argues 
that military forces was treated as an tool of last resort not only because it was 
morally questionable, but because the administrators of the empire believed that it 
ought to be unnecessary to their success. Tidrick’s first chapter, which addresses 
the role of evangelicalism in imperial administration, is particularly relevant to 
my research. 
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Van der Veer, Peter. “The Moral State: Religion, Nation, and Empire in Victorian Britain 
and British India.” In Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia, 
edited by Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, 15-43. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999. 
 
In this essay, van der Veer argues that religion played a key role in the formation 
of both modern Britain and modern India. This position leads him to consider the 
role of evangelicalism, specifically, in the British Empire. He argues that the 
evangelicalism reached far beyond the walls of any church or network of churches 
into the policies and laws of Imperial Britain, and therefore significantly 
influenced the regions that came under the Empire’s control. While van der Veer 
is not specifically interested in Central Asia, it seems clear that the same forces at 
work in the British government in London and the East India Company would 
have impacted the agents those bodies sent as their representatives into Central 
Asia. 
 
Waller, John H. Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of the Victorian Hero (New York: 
Antheneum, 1988), 322f. 
  
Waller’s biography seeks insight into Gordon’s character, as well into his political 
career. Thus he begins not by describing his origins or his career as a young 
officer, but by describing what fellow officers, government officials, and even 
Queen Victoria herself thought of him. The portion of this volume most relevant 
to this work is, of course, the account of the siege of Khartoum, which has 
striking parallels to the Stoddart and Conolly affair. 
 
Watson, J. R. “Soldiers and Saints: The Fighting Man and the Christian Life.” In 
Masculinity and Spirituality in Victorian Culture, edited by Andrew Bradstock, 
Sean Gill, Anne Hogan, and Sue Morgan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 
 
Watson analyzes the relationship between Christian faith and empire during the 
Victorian era through the lens of hymnody. In this analysis, the recurrence of 
martial themes, the frequent use of the imperative, and historical examples of 
British military men known for their faith indicates the extent to which the 
concepts of soldier and saint were intertwined in Victorian society. More 
specifically, Watson relies particularly on the hymns of Charles Wesley, the 
Methodist founder and prolific composer of hymns, although hymns by Sabrine 
Baring-Gould, William Walsham How, and others. Watson’s historical examples 
include Captain Hedley Vicars, Sir Henry Havelock, and General Gordon. 
 
Whitten, Dolphus Jr. “The Don Pacifico Affair.” The Historian 48 (1986): 255-268. 
  
Whitten’s article offers an extensive, detailed timeline of the Don Pacifico affair. 
He draws extensively on the Parliamentary debates on the subject, but also cites 
newspaper articles and personal letters from government officials. Thus his 
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narrative focuses on the British government’s perception of the crisis, which he 
portrays as an instance of nationalistic fervor. 
 
Wilde, Andreas. “Creating the Façade of a Despotic State.” In Explorations in the Social 
History of Modern Central Asia (19th - Early 20th Century), edited by Paolo 
Sartori, 267-298. Brill’s Inner Asian Library, Volume 29. Leiden: Brill, 2013. 
  
The subject of this article is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, Wilde is 
one of relatively few authors writing in English who works with Bukharan 
primary sources. His article is useful as an indicator of what the Bukharan 
archives (now located in Tashkent) contain. 
 
Yapp, M.E. Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798-1850. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980. 
 
Yapp provides an extensive history of British interests in Iran and Afghanistan 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. Two chapters focus specifically on 
Central Asia, covering the years 1838-1842 between them. Stoddart and Conolly 
figure heavily in the second of these two chapters, in which Yapp analyzes both 
their missions and their temperaments. Yapp questions the decision to send 
Stoddart to Bukhara, for example, observing that McNeill had less volatile 
officers at his command; he also compares Conolly to Alexei Karamazov, the 
hero of Dostoevsky’s masterpiece The Brothers Karamazov (see 403, 409f). 
While Yapp’s political analysis is astute, his consideration of Stoddart and 
Conolly’s characters is the most unique part of his work, and for the purposes of 
this thesis also the most useful. 
 
 
